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Excess Profits Taxation: Abnormalities
Affecting Income and Capitalt
CLAUDE O'QUIN*
The United States revived the excess profits tax upon cor-
porate income in 19401 with the dual purpose of raising revenue
and preventing profiteering on the current rearmament pro-
gram;2 and although this form of taxation has in the past raised
large sums of revenue, the latter was probably the dominant
motive for adopting the present legislation.' With that there can
be little quarrel so long as only excess profits are subjected to
the levy; the difficulty has arisen in determining what tax-free
credit should be allowed as the normal profits of industry.
Several methods of computing this credit have been sug-
gested,5 of which the most commonly applied6 have been the
invested capital basis, under which the taxpayer is allowed a
stipulated percentage of the capital employed in his business;
and the past earnings basis, under which the allowance is com-
puted from the earnings record of the taxpayer during a period
of years selected as "normal." Each of these bases is subject to
t This article was submitted in part fulfillment of the requirements for
the course in Corporation Finance at Harvard Law School.
* Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. Int. Rev. Code §§ 710-752, Second Revenue Act of 1940, tit. II, §§ 710-
752. The tax set forth in Sections 600-604 of the Internal Revenue Code is
an excess profits tax in name only. (See Buehler, The Taxation of Corporate
Excess Profits in Peace and War Times (1940) 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 291,
296-297.) This designation was changed to "Declared Value 'Excess Profits
Tax" Second Revenue Act of 1940, §506 (a).
2. H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st.Sess. (1941) 1.
3. Revenue raised by the War and Excess Profits taxes, 1917 to 1921:
1917, $1,638,000,000; 1918, $2,505,000,000; 1919, $1,431,000,000; 1920, $988,000,000;
1921, $335,000,000. Joint Hearings before the Committee on Finance on Excess
Profits Taxation, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 155; Buehler, supra note 1, at
293.
These figures are somewhat illusory, however, for large sums have been
returned and arc being returned for over assessments during these years.
See Joint Hearings Report, supra, at 101-103.
4. Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 77. The estimated net revenue
for 1940 is but $190,000,000 to $225,000,000. Id. at 103.
5. In addition to the invested capital and base earnings methods of
computation, and various modifications, (1) average percentage of profits to
invested capital over a period of years (id. at 215); (2) average percentage
of profits to sales over a period of years (id. at 253).
6. For the history and general form of excess profits taxes both in the
United States and abroad, see Buehler, supra note 1.
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modifications, and neither is entirely unobjectionable;7 and even
a combination of the two, allowing the taxpayer an option as to
which he shall adopt, is not a panacea. Abnormalities in the
capital or income of corporations are so varied and unforeseeable
that no inflexible statutory measure, however wisely framed,
can be applied equitably to all corporations throughout the
nation.8
If the tax is to be applied equitably, therefore, and levied
only upon excess profits, some provision must be made for the
relief of taxpayers affected by abnormalities. It is the purpose of
this paper to consider the provisions of the current act for adjust-
ing such abnormalities, in the light of experience under earlier
excess profits legislation, both with regard to the instances in
which these problems are likely to arise and the methods where-
by they may be alleviated.
Conditions which will effect a prejudicial abnormality nec-
essarily vary with the basis upon which the excess profits credit
is normally computed. If prior earnings are the basis, abnormally
low income during the base years will prejudice the taxpayer;
if invested capital is the basis, abnormality in that regard will be
prejudicial; and in any event, unusually high income during the
taxable year-the subject of the tax-will affect the amount
payable. When the taxpayer is given an election between the
capital and income bases, cases which will require special treat-
ment are restricted to those of taxpayers to whom neither basis
can be applied fairly; yet instances may arise under all three,
which may be generally classified:
I. Abnormalities affecting the basis of computation of the
excess profits credit.
A. When invested capital is the basis, and
1. Income-producing property is excluded from in-
vested capital by the terms of the statute.
Comment: If the statute permitted inclusion of all economic
elements which contributed to produce the taxpayer's income,
no abnormality could arise under this head. The staggering task
of computing the "capital" of every taxpayerO--difficulties ap-
parent from those encountered by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in appraising the relatively few properties of the
nation's railroads-has led the redactors of excess profits taxes
7. See Buehler, supra note 1, at 800.
8. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2.
9. Buehler, loc. cit. supra note 7.
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to substitute a similar concept of "invested capital," which is
more readily computed but which necessarily excludes some true
elements of capital.1" The number of taxpayers adversely
affected, of course, varies inversely with the broadness of the
particular "invested capital" concept.1 For example, the 1918 and
1921 Excess Profits Acts"2 restricted intangibles paid in for stock
or shares to twenty-five per cent of the par value of the stock or
shares outstanding, and this gave rise to numerous claims for
special assessment; no limitation so drastic is made in the 1940
act, so the field of abnormalities is materially reduced.1 8
2. Income is attributable in large part to intangible
factors which cannot be capitalized.
Example: T Company is a small "close" corporation, its principal
stockholders being four engineers who design labor-saving de-
vices, some of which are installed by T Company.1 4 A large part
of the corporate income is attributable to the engineers' personal
services.
B. When the basis is prior earnings, and
1. The character of the corporation has so materially
changed that the past earnings are not fairly repre-
sentative of present earning power.
Example: W Company, operated two departments during the base
years, one of them profitably and one at a loss; the liquidation of
the latter department, leaving only the department which had
consistently operated at a profit, was completed shortly before
the excess profits tax became effective. The base period earnings
reflect the net income of the retained department minus the net
10. See Cogger, The Selection of Comparatives under Section 328 (1926) 4
Nat. Inc.. Tax Mag. 421.
11. Cf. Peavy-Byrnes Lumber Co., 38 B.T.A. 249 (1938).
12. Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, 1§ 326(a)(4) and (5), 40 Stat. 1092
(1919) and 42 Stat. 274 (1923).
13. See treasury memorandum, "Advantages of the Invested Capital
Concept Contained in the Current Excess-Profits Tax Proposal Over [sic]
the Invested Capital Concept Contained In [sic] the Revenue Act of 1918,"
Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 94-95.
14. Guarantee Construction Co., 2 B.T. 1145 (1925).
The income for the current taxable year, in the example given, is not
affected by an abnormality; the taxpayer has received full credit for its
invested capital; but the excess profits credit computed from that invested
capital is not high enough to allow the corporation, tax-free, that return
which it normally should have. Therefore, under the terminology adopted
in this outline, the abnormality instanced affects the excess profits credit
computed on the capital baais.
.1941]
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loss of the liquidated department; earnings subject to the tax
have not been subjected to this drain. 15
2. The corporation experienced abnormally low net
earnings during one or more years of the base period.
Comment: This abnormality may be unique with the particular
taxpayer, or it may be common to all taxpayers in that trade or
industry. The first is the result, for example, of a strike or fire
which caused a temporary cessation of the particular taxpayer's
production at some time during the base period.16 The second is
caused by the fact that, although the base period was "normal"
for business as a whole, certain trades or industries may never-
theless have experienced depressed conditions.17 For example, it
has been testified that the steamship industry depends upon one
or two extremely piofitable years in each decade to reimburse
it for losses incurred during the interim periods and to yield a
reasonable return.18
Abnormally high expenses during one or more of the base
period years may also result in abnormally low net income, and
consequently an excess profits credit not fairly indicative of the
taxpayer's normal earning power.
3. The taxpayer corporation is materially prejudiced
by the time of incorporation.
Comment: Newly organized corporations are almost invariably
adversely affected in the computation of the excess profits credit
on income basis, either because of positive discriminations in
the statute o because their lack of an earnings record during
the base per d years compels the adoption of an artificial and
arbitrary credit not proportioned to their true earning power.'9
Example: X operated his business as an individual proprietor-
ship, earning a large return upon invested capital, until April 1,
15. See statement of Kenneth E. Armstrong, Comptroller of Marshall
Field & Co., Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 260 et seq.
16. Cf. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 12 B.T.A. 1024 (1928), affirmed 59 F.
(2d) 914 (1932); L.O. 100-A, 2 Cum. Bull. 299 (1920) [Section 327 of the 1918 act
applicable to abnormalities during base period ("prewar") years].
17. See Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations (3 ed. 1934) 165-169;
Joint Hearings Report supra note 3, at 334. Cf. Revenue Act of 1918, § 811,
40 Stat. 1090 (1919); L.O. 1000-A, 2 Cum. Bull. 299, 300 (1920).
S18. Statement of Otis M. Shepard, Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3,
at 238 et seq. Cf. Int. Rev. Code § 726; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 726.
19. Cf. Int. Rev. Code'§ 712; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 712, as
amended by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 713(d)(2); Int. Rev.
Code §713(d)(2), Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 4; Int. Rev.
Code § 741; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 741. See infra, p. 716 et seq.
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1940; on that date the business was incorporated. 20 Since the
corporation was not in existence during any of the base period
years (1936-39)21 it had no earnings record of its own upon
which a credit could be determined; and there was no provision
in the Excess Profits Act of 1940 as originally passed to permit
calculation of the credit on the basis of prior earnings of the
proprietorship. 22 The taxpayer was placed at a great disadvan-
tage in comparison with an identical corporation which was or-
ganized during even a part of the base period.28 Under the 1941
amendments, however, the corporation may compute its tax
credit from the business' pre-incorporation income of the base
period.24
The problem of an entirely new enterprise is not so easily
solved.2 5
IL Abnormalities affecting the taxpayer's income for the
taxable year.
A. When the taxpayer has received "income" during the
taxable year which is not properly attributable to its
income-producing activities of that year.
Comment: This type of abnormality is due to statutory definitions
of income which do not coincide with economic concepts and
will usually arise with regard to taxpayers making their returns
on the cash basis; the most common example would be a cash
basis taxpayer's realization of "profits" during the taxable year
which are attributable in whole or in part to activities of another
year, as when payment is made in a single lump sum on a con-
tract the performance of which has required, or will require,
20. Cf. Statement of K. T. Norris, Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3,
at 206 et seq.
21. Int. Rev. Code § 713(b).
22. H.R. Rep. 46, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (March 7, 1941) 14; Int. Rev. Code
§ 712; Second Revenue Act of 1941, § 712. Sections 741 and 742 of the Internal
Revenue Code originally- did not affect corporations which have acquired
individual proprietorships and partnerships after the base period, because
the definition of an "acquiring corporation" in Section 740 of the code was
limited to the acquiring of the assets of other corporations.
23. For computation of excess profits credit on income basis when the
corporation has been in existence only a part of the base period, see infra
notes 175 and 259.
24. Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 8, amending Int. Rev. Code
§§ 740, 742, "to permit the earnings of the predecessor partnership or pro-
prietorship to be reflected in the base period credit of the resulting corpora-
tion in those instances in which the assets of the partnership or proprietor-
ship are transferred to the corporation in a tax-free exchange." H. R. Rep.
46, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 14.
25. See infra, p. 716 et seq.
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more than a year. 26 A somewhat different form is presented when
the taxpayer realizes taxable "income" due to sale of capital
assets in a reorganization maneuver.27
B. When the taxpayer's expense deductions have been
abnormally low during the taxable year, because sums
properly attributable to business expenses of that year
have not actually been paid during that period.
Comment: Many small corporations pay inadequate salaries
to managers who are also the principal stockholders, and who
accept their stock dividends both as interest on their capital and
as payment for their personal services. Situations of this kind
contributed many special assessment claims under the earlier
acts, the retroactivity of the legislation perventing timely ad-
justment of salaries. The corporation income tax of recent years
has probably caused most salaries to be "adjusted" long before
the effective date of the 1940 Excess Profits Act, however.28
The problem may also rise when, for example, need for
facilities during the taxable year causes the taxpayers to delay
repairs until the following year.29
Conceding that abnormalities should be adjusted, the prob-
lem remains of determining how the tax burden may% be
alleviated in such circumstances without permitting taxpayers
not equitably entitled to reduction to evade payment of their
full tax, thus defeating the principal purpose of the legislation
and depriving the government of revenue. This is, in essence, a
dual problem: (1) how, when, and by whom shall relief be
granted; and (2) what relief shall be granted.
How, WHEN, AND BY WHOM SHALL RELIEF BE GRANTE?
The special relief provision may be formulated as a series
of specific paragraphs, each applying to a particular type of
26. Cf. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 24 B.TJA. 626 (1931).
27. Cf. Wallis Tractor Co. and J. I. Case Plow Works, 3 B.T.A. 981 (1926).
28. The situation will persist in the case of growing corporations in
need of additional capital, the owner-managers agreeing to draw only enough
for living expenses and "plow back" as much as possible into the business.
Cf. Sol Frankel, Inc., 8 B.TJ.L 494 (1926). See Joint Hearings Report, supra
note 3, at 206: "My business is one of those businesses that was an individual
proprietorship and was only recently incorporated. The reason it had to be
incorporated was that the income tax laws are so severe there would have
been no money left with which to expand the business."
29. Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co., 19 B.T.A. 152 (1930). Cf. Home Bene-
ficial Association, 15 B.T.A. 1319 (1929).
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abnormality, application of the indicated relief being mandatory
whenever the indicated conditions are proved to exist; or the pro-
vision's form may be broad and general, with application to
specific cases left to the discretion of administrative officials or
to an independent board.
The difficulty with the former is that it is inelastic; as the
Ways and Means Committee has remarked,
"Experience with excess-profits taxes, both in the United
States and abroad, has demonstrated conclusively that relief
in abnormal cases cannot be predicated on specific instances
foreseeable at any time. The unusual cases that are certain to
arise are so diverse in character and unpredictable that relief
provisions couched in other than general and flexible terms
are certain to prove inadequate."8 0
The very flexibility of a general provision, on the other hand,
necessitates a considerable degree of discretion in its application.
Senator Smoot said of the discretionary power granted under the
1918 Act, "If exercised wisely it will be a relief to the institutions
of the country, and many of them will need it, but if exercised
unjustly or unwisely there will be a frightful discrimination
between business concerns and industries of the country."81 If
this discretion is granted to the Treasury Department, as it was
by the 1918 and 1921 Acts, dissatisfaction is likely to arise from
even the fairest administration; for, as was suggested to the Ways
and Means Committee twenty years ago, "it is like trying your
case before the other fellow's lawyer.8 32
Form and Administration under the 1918 and 1921 Acts
There was no provision for review of special assessment
determinations under the 1918 and 1921 statutes, which simply
directed
"That in the following cases the tax shall be determined
as provided in section 328 ("Computation of Tax in Special
Cases"): ....
"(d) Where upon application by the corporation the Com-
missioner finds and so declares of record that the tax if de-
termined without benefit of this section would, owing to
30. H. R4 Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2. Cf. 57 Cong. Rec. 506(1918).
31. 57 Cong. Rec. 506 (1918).
32. Letter from Edgar Rogers, Revenue Revision Hearings before the
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (1921).266.
1941]
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abnormal conditions affecting the capital or income of the
corporation, work upon the corporation an exceptional hard-
ship evidenced by gross disproportion between the tax com-
puted without benefit of this section and the tax computed by
reference to the representative corporations specified in section
328. This subdivision shall not apply to any case (1) in which
the tax (computed without benefit of this section) is high
merely because the corporation earned within the taxable
year a high rate of profit upon a normal invested capital nor
(2) in which 50 per centum or more of the gross income of
the corporation for the. taxable year (computed under section
233 of Title II) consists of gains, profits, commissions, or other
income, derived on a cost-plus basis from a Government con-
tract or contracts made between April 6, 1917, and November
11, 1918, both dates inclusive."88
A form of appeal was allowed within the department, 8' but
the popular demand for supervision by an independent board 5
33. Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, § 327, 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42 Stat.
275 (1923). Subsection (a) permitted special assessment when the commis-
sioner was unable to determine the invested capital under Section 326, the
ordinary computation provision (compare Int. Rev. Code § 723; Second Rev-
enue Act of 1940, § 723); subsection (b), in the case of a foreign corporation
and (under the 1921 act only) certain corporations with income from sources
within possessions of the United States; subsection (c), where a mixed ag-
gregate of tangible and intangible property had been paid in for stock or
for stock and bonds and the commissioner was unable satisfactorily to de-
termine the respective values of the several classes of property at the time
of payment, or to distinguish the classes of property paid in for stock and
for bonds, respectively.
The 1917 act [War Revenue Act, tit. II, §§ 200-213, 40 Stat. 302 (1919)] con-
tained no provision for relief of abnormalities [Saner-Ragley Lumber Co.,
3 B.T.A. 927 (1926)], although special assessment was permitted when the
Secretary of the Treasury was unable to determine invested capital [40 Stat.
307, § 210 (1919)J; the finding could not be made by the commissioner
[United States v. Gulzler, 105 F. (2d) 188 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939)]. Although the
same circumstances may at the same time give rise to an abnormality and
render computation of invested capital impossible, as in Viscose Co., 3 B.T.A.
444 (1926), such an impossibility would be an abnormality of invested capital
only if the statute provided that all property the value of which could not
be established should be excluded from invested capital.
See, however, Enameled Metals Co., 14 B.T.A. 1392, 1397 (1929): "It is a
matter of official record, disclosed in hearings before congressional com-
mittees, that in practice the Commissioner did not limit the application of
section 210 of the Revenue Act of 1917 to the single situation there set out,
but broadened the application to cover such situations as are described in
section 327 of the Revenue Act of 1918." Will this be the tendency under
Section 723 of the present act, as to abnormalities for which no relief is
provided?
There was also a special provision for foreign corporations in the 1917
act, § 207(b), 40 Stat. 306 (1919).
34. See Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 562n,
48 S.Ct. 587, 590n, 72 L.Ed. 985, 989n (1928).
35. See letter cited supra note 32. Cf. Joint Hearings Report, supra note
3, at 246.
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was not satisfied until the organization of the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1924.36 Early in its history the board held" that its
general jurisdiction extended to supervision of the commission-
er's determinations under the special assessment provisions when
deficiencies were asserted;88 and this was affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court in the earliest important case it considered
on this subject, Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Company.89
Williamsport Wire Rope Company v. United States,40 in-
volving the right to court review of the administrative discretion,
had been delayed pending the Oesterlein opinion with the expec-
tation that the decision with regard to the board's jurisdiction
would also determine the question of judicial review. When the
Williamsport case appeared, however, the Supreme Court held
that the commissioner's determinations under Sections 327 and
328 were not subject to reexamination in the courts:
"To perform that task [of making special assessments],
power discretionary in character was necessarily conferred.
Whether, as provided in paragraph (d) of § 327, there are
'abnormal conditions'; whether, because of these conditions,
computation under § 301 would work 'exceptional hardship';
whether there would be 'gross disproportion' between the tax
36. 43 Stat. 336 (1925).
37. Oesterlein Machine Co., 1 B.T.A. 159 (1924). The Oesterlein case
applied, strictly, only to Sections 327 and 328 of the 1918 and 1921 acts; but
the same rule was held applicable to Section 210 of the 1917 act in Browns-
ville & Matamoros Bridge Co., 1 B.T.A. 320 (1925).
"This Board was not created for the purpose of reviewing rulings made
by the Commissioner but was created for the purpose of determining the
correctness of deficiencies in tax found by the Commissioner. If the defici-
ency in tax found by him is greater than the true deficiency the Board has
authority to decrease it; if It is less than the true deficiency, the Board has
authority to increase it [Appeal of the Hotel De France Co., 1 B.T.A. 28
(1924)].
"If a taxpayer can prove to this Board that he is entitled to a deduction
from gross income, the deduction will be allowed even though it has never
been claimed by the taxpayer at any hearing had before the Commissioner;
otherwise it would be impossible for the Board to determine the correct
amount of the deficiency." Gutterman Strauss Co., 1 B.T.A. 243, 245 (1924).
38. The board was without jurisdiction as to years with respect to which
no deficiencies were asserted. See Pittsburg Supply Co., 14 B.T.A. 620, 621
(1928).
39. 275 U.S. 220, 48 S.Ct. 87, 72 L.Ed. 249 (1927).
40. 277 U.S. 551, 48 S.Ct. 587, 72 L.Ed. 985 (1928). Sections 327 and 328 of
the 1918 act were involved here, but the same rule applied under Section 210
of the 1917 act. Duquesne Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 799, 51 S.Ct.
491, 75 L.Ed. 1422 (1931), per curiam affirmation of 41 F.(2d) 995 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1930); Central Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 56, 6 F. Supp. 115
(1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 563, 55 S.Ct. 75, 79 L.Ed. 663 (1934).
The 'Williamsport case cannot be reconciled with the language in Blair
v. Oesterlein Machine Co., a fact upon which the court remarked in Ryan
Car Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.(2d) 26, 27 (C.C-. 9th, 1930).
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computed under § 301 and 'that computed by reference to
the representative corporations specified in section 328'; what
are 'representative corporations engaged in a like or similar
trade or business'; which corporations are 'as nearly as may
be, similarly circumstanced with respect to gross income, net
income, profits per unit of business transacted and capital em-
ployed, the amount and rate of war profits or excess profits,
and all other relevant facts and circumstances'-these are all
questions of administrative discretion."41
The circuit court of appeals subsequently held42 that the
Williamsport case did not extend to review of board decisions on
this point, jurisdiction of which it considered to have been con-
ferred upon it by statute;48 but this holding was overruled by two
memorandum opinions of the Supreme Court,44 citing only the
Williamsport case. So "The action of the Commissioner or the
board, in passing upon the right of a taxpayer to a special assess-
ment, is not subject to review by the courts, unless based upon no
evidence, or contrary to law, or so manifestly arbitrary and un-
reasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion. 45
Furthermore, when the taxpayer upon application obtained
a determination of his tax under the special assessment provisions,
he surrendered the right further to contest in court the correct-
ness of the commissioner's determination with respect to any of
the factors necessary to his discretionary finding and the com-
putation of the tax;" the taxpayer could seek a judicial rede-
41. 277 U.S. 551, 559, 48 S.Ct. 587, 589, 72 L.Ed. 985, 987 (1928).
42. Ryan Car Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.(2d) 26 (C.C.A. 9th, 1930).
43. 44 Stat. 110 (1927), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1141 (1940).
44. Duquesne Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 799, 51 S.Ct. 491, 75
L.Ed. 1422 (1931); Enameled Metals Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 799, 51 S.Ct. 491,
75 L.Ed. 1422 (1931).
45. Peytona Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 55 F.(2d) 27, 29 (C.C.A. 4th,
192), cert. denied 287 U.S. 612, 53 S.Ct. 15, 77 L.Ed. 532 (1932). Quaere
whether the exceptions are not unjustifiably broad. Compare L. J. Chris-
topher Co. v. Commissioner, 60 App. D. C. 368, 55 F.(2d) 530 (1931), in which
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that it had jurisdic-
tion to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals denying the.taxpayer
special assessment without permitting him to introduce evidence; the deci-
sion was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
46. Central Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 56, 6 F. Supp. 115
(1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 563, 55 S.Ct. 75, 79 L.Ed. 663 (1934). The reason-
ing of the court of claims was that, "the system provided by law for a
judicial review of the Commissioner's actions in tax cases contemplates
that the court shall render final judgment, and, since the court is without
jurisdiction to substitute its decision for that of the Commissioner as to
the factors to be used in computing the tax, it cannot proceed with a case
as though special assessment had not been applied, and the court is likewise
without jurisdiction to decide the question presented and remand the case
[Vol. i
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termination of these factors either with respect to the excess
profits' 7 or the income tax.' 8 Beyond this, the lower federal courts
have held that the granting of a special assessment did"9 not pre-
clude court action to recover taxes paid thereunder
(1) when special assessment was made without application
by the taxpayer, 0 or upon a qualified application;
51
(2) when the taxpayer did not acquiesce in the special as-
sessment made after request, and the commissioner did not con-
sider the assessment finally closed;
5 2
(3) when the finding of the factors necessary for application
of the special assessment provisions was not made by the proper
official, or where the finding showed that it did not satisfy the
statute;58
(4) when the question involved was whether the taxpayer
was in an exempt class, 5 ' and that fact could be determined with-
to the Commissioner for further exercise of his discrbtionary powers to
determine whether or not the change in net income results in a greater or
less profits tax." 6 F. Supp. at 115-116.
47. Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U.S. 502, 53 S.Ct. 413, 77 L.Ed. 291
(1933).
48. Welch v. Obispo Oil Co., 301 U.S. 190, 57 S.Ct. 684, 81 L.Ed. 1033 (1937).
49. As the recent dates of many of the cases cited reflect, these questions
are still live issues, some cases still pending (Joint Hearings Report, supra
note 3, at 100); but it has been deemed advisable to adopt the past tense in
treating of the 1917, 1918, and 1921 acts.
50. Daily Pantagraph, Inc. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 251, 37 F.(2d) 783
(1929). This point was not before the Supreme Court when it reversed the
court of claims decision on another ground in Daily Pantagraph, Inc. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 813, 51 S. Ct. 214, 75 L.Ed. 728, (1931). But cf. United
States v. Gutzler, 105 F.(2d) 188 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939), in which this factor was
present but was not made the basis of the court's decision.
51. American Chemical Paint Co. v. McCaughn, 19 A.F.T.R. 1311 (E.D.
Pa. 1937). The condition was that the application should be disregarded if,
under the law, the special assessment would deprive the applicant of his
right to court review.
52. McKeever v. Eaton, 6 F. Supp. 697 (D. Conn. 1934). The decision
does not purport to go beyond the particular record, under which the court
found (1) that the commissioner was adequately apprised, prior to mak-
ing the special assessment, of the various grounds upon which error was
claimed in his computation of the tax; (2) that the taxpayer did not acqui-
esce in the decision arrived at by the commissioner; (3) that the commis-
sioner never took the position that his special assessment concluded the
matter, but continued reexamining the situation upon the merits for several
years after the special assessment had been made. See 6 F. Supp. at 702.
The latter finding would appear to be irrelevant, since the commissioner can
withdraw a special assessment altogether, or substitute another, at any time
until the statute of limitations has run, provided that a formal closing
agreement has not been entered into. Oak Worsted Mills v. United States,
68 Ct. Cl. 539, 38 F.(2d) 699 (1930); New Jersey Worsted Mills v. Gnichtel, 116
F.(2d) 388 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1940).
53. United States v. Gutzler, 105 F.(2d) 188 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939).
54. Garrow, McClain & Garrow v. Bass, 88 F.(2d) 574 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937),
cert. denied 302 U.S. 697, 58 S.Ct. 15, 82 L.Ed. 538 (1937). The taxpayer con-
tended that it was a personal service corporation, and in the alternative
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out investigation of any of the factors necessary to the commis-
sioner's discretionary findings,55 and when the taxpayer has not
agreed to concede taxable status in order to secure the special
assessment.
5 6
The enumerated limitations, however, cannot be considered
definitively settled; the history of court review after invocation
of the special assessment clauses has been one of liberal con-
struction of the taxpayer's right by the lower courts, followed by
strict limitation upon presentation of the question to the
Supreme Court.
So far as the courts were concerned, the commissioner's
only duty under the earlier acts was to consider the taxpayer's
claim for special assessment; 57 his discretion could not be fet-
tered, and he could not be compelled to make any particular
decision, nor to give his reasons for refusing relief.5 Even after
granting a special assessment, he was not precluded from
reconsidering his action and either withdrawing the special
assessment altogether or redetermining the tax under the special
asked for special assessment under Sections 327 and 328 of of the 1918 act.
Held, "If it [the taxpayer] is liable to be taxed as a corporation, the amount
of that tax has been finally fixed [by the special assessment] and is in fact
not now questioned. But if it is not thus liable, it may have the court so to
adjudge." 88 F.(2d) at 576.
55. The taxpayer could not seek court determination that no tax is due
?3ecause its net income was actually within the non-taxable margin, for that
would require judicial consideration of the factors involved in the finding
and computation of the tax under Section 328. Central Iron & Steel Co. v.
United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 56, 6 F. Supp. 115 (1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 563,
55 S.Ct. 75, 79 L.Ed. 663 (1934); Michigan Iron & Land Co. v. United States,
6 F. Supp. 563 (Ct. Cl. 1935). These cases may be distinguished from Gar-
row, McClain & Garrow v. Bass, 88 F.(2d) 574 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937), on the
ground that the court there had only to consider the nature of the corp-
oration and its activities, not factors of net income or invested capital.
56. The court intimated, in Garrow, McClain & Garrow v. Bass, 88 F.(2d)
574, 576 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 697, 58 S.Ct. 15, 82 L.Ed. 538
(1937), that the commissioner might have required the taxpayer to admit it
was a taxable corporation before granting the special assessment, and thus
have prevented the taxpayer's subsequently urging its exempt status in
court. See Michigan Iron & Land Co. v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 563, 570-
571 (Ct. Cl. 1935).
57. Mandamus lay to compel the commissioner to consider the tax-
payer's claim and decide it. United States ex rel. Botany Worsted Mills v.
Helvering, 67 App. D. C. 104, 89 F.(2d) 848 (1937).
5& 67 App. D. C. at 111, 89 F.(2d) at 855: "We think the petition for
mandamus should have been granted, not to require the Commissioner to
make any particular decision, nor to limit his discretion by the action of
his predecessor for the years 1917-1918 which, so far as we know, may have
been altogether wrong, but only to require him to determine and announce
his final decision on the merits of the claim."
On the taxpayer's right to introduce evidence in support of his claim,
compare L. J. Christopher Co. v. Commissioner, 60 App. D. C. 368, 55 F.(2d)
580 (1981).
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provisions,5 9 and without apprising the taxpayer of the facts
upon which the redetermination was made.60
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, in the exercise of its
power of review over the commissioner's determinations, held6 '
that the granting of special assessment was mandatory when
any of the specified conditions 62 were found to exist; and the
special assessment device could not be used to raise the tax pay-
able, since these sections were intended as relief provisions.63
The board's attitude toward abnormalities was not entirely
consistent. In the first volume of its reports, the board said in
Morris & Company, Incorporated:
"It can not be consistently said that the statute excludes
the item from invested capital and at the same time treats
such exclusion as so abnormal as to be the ground for relief
by special assessment."'6"
Specifically, this statement applied only to those abnormalities
classified under I (A) (1), supra; 5 but the "logic" behind it,
carried to its conclusion, would have resulted in a denial of relief
from any abnormalities caused by the statutory disregard of
elements material to computation of the truly excess profits-
would have defeated the sole purpose of the special relief pro-
59. Oak Worsted Mills v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 539, 38 F.(2d) 699
(1930); New Jersey Worsted Mills V. Gnichtel, 116 F.(2d) 338 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1940). This was subject to the applicable statute of limitations, of course, and
to the formulation of a formal closing agreement. 116 F.(2d) at 342.
60. New Jersey Worsted Mills v. Gnichtel, 116 F.(2d) 338 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1940).
61. Oesterlein Machine Co., 1 B.T.A. 159 (1924);. Davis & Andrews Co.,
2 B.T.A. 328 (1925).
62. The four conditions for application of special assessment under the
1918 and 1921 acts are set forth in Section 327 [40 Stat. 1093 (1919), 42 Stat.
275 (1923)]. See pp. 673, 674, and note 33, supra.
63. Sumpter Valley Ry., 10 B.T.A,. 1325 (1928); Hotel Wisconsin Realty
Co., 16 B.T.A. 334 (1929), affirmed without discussion of this point 47 F.(2d)
842 (1931); Gold and Stock Telegraph Co., 26 B.T.A. 914 (1932), affirmed
without discussion of this point 83 F.(2d) 465 (1936), cert. denied 299 U.S.
564, 57 S.Ct. 26, 81 L.Ed. 415 (1936). See United States v. Gutzler, 105 F.(2d)
188, 193 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939).
The Sumpter Valley case would seem to render obsolete the earlier
decisions (1) that the commissioner could not make a special assessment
when the taxpayer could show that the conditions specified in the statute
did not exist [Brownsville & Matamoros Bridge Co., 1 B.T.A. 320 (1925)], for
the taxpayer would have had no interest in introducing such evidence unless
the tax under ordinary statutory assessment had been lower; and (2) that
the tax computed under the special assessment could not exceed that de-
termined under Section 302 of the 1918 and 1921 acts [40 Stat. 1089 (1919) and
42 Stat. 272 (1923); Davis & Andrews Co., 2 B.T.-A 328 (1925)], for that
section was limitation upon the ordinary imposition section.
64. 1 B.T.A. 704, 706 (1925).
65. Supia p. 668.
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visions.66 This view manifested itself again in High Shoals Com-
pany,6 7 in which water power worth $350,000 was includible in
statutory invested capital only in the amount of $50,000,61 yet
special assessment was refused. The vigorous dissent of Tram-
mell, in which Phillips concurred, reviewed the legislative his-
tory of the special assessment provisions, and concluded that
" ... the question ... presents itself whether, when the
taxpayer has in its business assets of a recognized and sub-
stantial value which are producing income and which it can
not capitalize, due to the limitations of section 326, an abnor-
mality exists which brings it within the provisions of section
327. My view is that it does. That fact, in my opinion, is an
abnormality affecting capital, as provided in section 327, pro-
vided the amount excluded from invested capital on this
account is substantial in amount." 9
The same year Trammell reiterated his view in the majority
opinion of the board in G. M. Standifer Construction Corpora-
tion 0 stating that, "This section of the statute [327] is admittedly
relief legislation and should be liberally construed in accordance
with the well-accepted rule of statutory construction with re-
spect to such legislation."'" Ultimately Trammell's view pre-
vailed, and in subsequent board decisions the distinction was
commonly drawn,
"We have held that a taxpayer does not fall within the pro-
visions of sections 327 and 328 merely because assets are used
in the business which may not be included in invested capital.
Morris & Co., 1 B.T.A. 704. The exclusion must be such as to
create an abnormal condition. ' '17 (Italics supplied.)
66. Compare the criticism in Friedman, Attitude of the Board of Tax
Appeals in Special Assessment Cases (1926) 4 Nat. Inc. Tax Mag. 347, 348:
"Such construction would defeat the letter and spirit of the special
relief sections.
"Congress expressly excluded 'borrowed money' from invested capital;
yet we know from the legislative history that it is intended to give relief in
cases where borrowed money constitutes an abnormal condition. The Board
itself seems to have recognized borrowed money as an abnormality in the
Saner-Ragley Lumber Company appeal, 3 B.T.A. 927 (1926)."
67. 3 B.T.A. 305 (1926).
68. Because Section 326(a)(2) of the 1918 act [40 Stat. 1092 (1921). Cf. 42
Stat. 274 (1923)] provided that tangible property paid in for shares of
capital stock was to be included in invested capital only to the extent of
the value at the time of such payment, without regard to subsequent en-
hancement. See High Shoals Co., 3 B.T.A. 305, 307-308 (1926).
69. 3 B.T.A. at 309.
70. 4 B.T.A. 525 (1926).
71. Id. at 561.
72. Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B.T.A. 1192, 1198-1199 (1928). See
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Detailed consideration of the situations which the board
considered "abnormal" within the meaning of the statute would
not be particularly profitable; abnormalities were determined on
the facts of each case,7 8 and the many diverse factors involved in
most were not always differentiated in the final determination.
In general, however, the board required proof that the alleged
abnormality was substantia17 4 and that it was unusual in the
taxpayer's trade or business.7 5 If the abnormality was an exclu-
sion of capital, the taxpayer was required to show that the
property excluded (from statutory invested capital) was actually
used in the operation of the business or that it contributed to
the production of taxable income.1 6
The substantiality requirement was simply common sense;
as the board itself expressed it,
also Rothschild Colortype Co., 14 B.T.A. 718, 722 (1928); Farnsworth, Hoyt
Co., 16 B.T.A. 309, 314 (1929); Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 187, 192
(1929); The Evansville Courier, 23 B.T.A. 862, 871 (1931). The Marc Eidltz
case limits the effect of Morris & Co. even more markedly: "While ex-
clusion by reason of section 331 would not necessarily be a statutory ab-
normal condition, Morris & Co., 1 B.T.A. 704, such exclusion would also not
be a complete obstruction to special assessment where abnormal conditions
plainly existed which made the normal plan of the excess-profits tax fairly
inapplicable. Clarence Whitman & Rons, Inc., 11 B.T.A. 1192." (Italics sup-
plied.) (18 B.T.A. at 192).
78. See G. M. Standifer Construction Corp., 4 B.TJ.A 525, 561 (1928).
74. Enameled Metals Co., 14 B.T.A. 1392 (1929); Union Drawn Steel Co..
15 B.T.A. 761 (1929).
75. Mutual Oil Co. of Arizona, 14 B.T.A. 538 (1928) (high percentage of
borrowed capital); Kimball Tyler Co. of Maryland, 18 B.T.A. 729 (1930)
(plant leased from stockholders at rental below market rate); Garden City
Feeder Co., 35 B.T.A. 770, 783 (1937). "If it was customary for corporations
engaged in similar businesses to operate upon borrowed money to an extent
comparable to that of this petitioner, the borrowed capital used by petitioner
could not be said to constitute an abnormal condition. Mere proof of bor-
rowing does not establish abnormality, and, in the absence of evidence
respecting the use generally of borrowed capital in the particular line of
business, there is no basis upon which we may predicate an opinion that
the use of borrowed money in this case created an abnormality."
See Barton, Special Assessment under the Revenue Acts of 1918 and
1921 (1923) 96 Cent. L. J. 331, 332.
But cf. The Evansville Courier, 23 B.T.A. 862 (1931), in which special
assessment was accorded under Section 327(d) because the "most substantial
part of petitioner's capital"-its circulation, good will, and Associated Press
franchise-were excluded from invested capital under Section 326(a)(5);
nothing was said of the unusualness requirement, although most newspapers
would probably face this same problem, either because the circulation and
good will were paid in for stock (as here), or because they were built up
in the course of time to a value far in excess of any expenditures which
could be computed in invested capital. Cf. The Daily Pantagraph, Inc., 9
B.T.A. 1173 (1928).
76. Garden City Feeder Co., 35 B.T.A. 770 (1937) (borrowed capital). Cf.
J. D. Williams, Inc., 22 B.T.A. 21 (1931) (secret formulae). See the Evansville




"In many businesses there will be some good will, or some
appreciation in the value of assets, or some other factor which
can not enter into the computation of invested capital. The
exclusion must be such as to cause exceptional hardship.
" ...no two businesses can be alike in all their factors.
Each is bound to have certain favorable or unfavorable con-
ditions as compared with others. It was not to such things as
these that Congress had reference in the use of the word
abnormalities in section 327, but rather to those situations
where by reason of some peculiarity in the corporate struc-
ture, invested capital was unusually small as compared with
the total .capital employed in the business or income was
affected by some unusual circumstance." '"7
The requirement that the circumstance complained of be un-
usual in the taxpayer's trade or business was the necessary re-
sult of the statutory phrase, "exceptional hardship as evidenced
by gross disproportion between the tax computed without bene-
fit of this section and the tax computed by reference to the
representative corporations specified in section 328";'1 but it was
unfortunate in that it denied relief for abnormalities which
might affect an entire industry.79
The requirement that the abnormality result in "exceptional
hardship" led to denials of special assessment when the taxpayer
had "considerable admitted invested capital,"8 and when the
taxpayer was already in the lowest tax bracket.8
In accordance with the specific direction of Section 327 (d) -
absolutely necessary, indeed, if the statute was to impose a tax
at all-special assessment was denied when the taxpayer's in-
come resulted merely from a high return on normal invested
77. Enameled Metals Co., 14 B.T.A. 1392, 1398 (1929). Compare Raymond
Syndicate, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 600, 605 (1930): "A condition that is common to
many corporations does not create such an abnormality in invested capital
as warrants the application of special assessment."
78. Section 327(d) of the 1918 and 1921 acts, 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42
Stat. 275 (1923). See pp. 673-674, supra.
79. Quaere as to the extent to which the board disregarded the rule In
such situations. See note 75, supra. See L.O. 1000-A, 2 Cum. Bull. 299, 300(1920): "[Section 311, 40 Stat. 1090 (1919)] gives relief to industries which
passed through a period of depression In the prewar years." This, however,
related only to the war profits tax credit.
80. Powell Coal Co., 12 B.T.A. 492 (1928). But cf. Marc Eidlitz & Son,
Inc., 18 B.T.A. 187 (1929), in which special assessment was granted when
"[the taxpayer's] invested capital, although substantial, was only remotely
responsible for its earnings."
81. Railroad Supply Co., 15 B.T.A. 1204 (1929).
[Vol. III
1941] EXCESS PROFITS TAXATION
capital; 2 as a consequence of this, "efficient management" was
never regarded as an abnormality,3 and large income alone was
not proof of abnormality, even though the net return for the year
exceeded invested capital.8 4 The second proviso of Section 327 (d)
-that special assessment should not be accorded a taxpayer fifty
per cent or more of whose gross income was derived on a cost-plus
basis from a government contract or contracts made during
the war period-was also enforced by the board by requiring the
taxpayer to negative the existence of such a condition. 5
The burden was properly placed upon the taxpayer to prove
that it came within the provisions of Section 327.86 Data on
representative taxpayers was not available to the taxpayer,"7
however; accordingly the board considered that the taxpayer had
made a prima facie showing of the applicability of Section 327 (d)
upon its proving that abnormal conditions affected its capital or
income, although the "gross disproportion" of the tax and result-
ant "exceptional hardship"- as evidenced by comparisons-were
not indicated.8
Even with this concession, it was failure to sustain the
burden of proof rather than the invalidity of the abnormalites
urged which accounted for a majority of the rejected claims for
special assessment.s ' This was unfortunate, but inevitable; a
lesser burden of proof would have permitted evasions by the
very taxpayers upon whom the levy was intended to rest.
82. Logan-Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B.T.A. 647 (1925); Lowe & Campbell
Athletic Goods Co., 18 B.T.A. 1134 (1930). Cf. T.B.M. 7, 1 Cum. Bull. 303 (1919).
83. United Shoe Stores Co., 2 B.T.A. 73 (1925); Cleveland & Western
Coal Co., 4 B.T.A. 93 (1926); Connors-Weyman Steel Co., 23 B.T.A. 625 (1931).
Cf. A.R.R. 338, 3 Cum. Bull. 368 (1920). See Friedman, supra note 66, at 347.
84. Goldie Oil & Gas Co., 18 B.T.A. 443 (1929), and cases cited thereirr.
But cf. Woodbury Shoe Co., 19 B.T.A. 433 (1930).
85. Logan-Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B.T.A. 647 (1925).
86. Huff, Anrews & Thomas, 1 B.T.A. 542 (1925); Richards and Brennan
Co., 1 B.T.A. 972 (1925). Cf. Gaukler & Stewart, 1 B.T.A. 578 (1925); Gottlieb
Bros., 1 B.T.A. 684 (1925).
87. Barton, supra note 75, at 335. The so-called "secrecy provisions" con-
tained in Section 3167 of the Revised Statutes, as reenacted by Section 1018
of the Revenue Act of 1924 [43 Stat. 344 (1925)] were relied upon by the
commissioner even to the extent of resisting subpoena by the Board of Tax
Appeals. See Oesterlein Machine Co., 1 B.T.A. 159, 163-167 (1924); Friedman,
supra note 66, at 349. The commissioner refused to comply with subpoenas
requiring information from returns of other taxpayers relevant to the in-
quiry (ibid.) until the Supreme Court upheld the board's power [Blair v.
Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220, 48 S.Ct. 87, 72 L.Ed. 249 (1927)1.
88. Pierce Oil Corp., 32 B.T.A. 403, 416 (1935). See Garden City Feeder
Co., 35 B.T.A. 770, 782 (1937); Peavy-Byrnes Lumber Co., 38 B.T.A. 249, 254
(1938).
89. Cases cited 3 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 53484, 53524. See
Friedman, supra note 66, at 308-309.
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There were decisions denying abnormalities which might
validly be criticized; there was discontent aroused in some circles
by the administration of the relief provisions; but, on the whole,
the results attained were satisfactory. Certainly the applications
by the board were more equitable than the results which could
have been secured under a relief provision as inflexible as the
taxing measure itself.
The greatest objection to Sections 327 and 328, perhaps, is
the tremendous amount of litigation which they provoked-liter-
ally thousands of cases, some of which were still pending when
the 1940 Excess Profits Act was imposed.90
Form and Administration under the 1940 Act
The Second Revenue Act of 1940 as originally proposed91
made no provision for relief of abnormalities; 92 the treasury con-
sidered that the improvements in the new act's basic structure-
particularly tht treatment of intangible property on the same
basis as any other,98 and the inclusion of a portion of the taxpay-
er's borrowed capital in statutory invested capital 9 -rendered
such relief unnecessary." There is no doubt that this liberaliza-
tion of the concept of invested capital, and the provision of an
alternative basis for computation of the excess profits credit
(computed from the tax-payer's earnings during the years 1936 to
1939, inclusive) will alleviate many situations which would have
90. See Statement of Colin F. Stam, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 97, 100:
"MR. McCORMACK. Mr. Stain, under your plan, the question of in-
vested capital is based on the general theory of looking at the earnings in
terms of dollars made during the base period, instead of in terms of per-
centages. So that a corporation, having a 4-year base-period experience, will
not have the complicated questions of invested capital arise. That was a
very difficult question in the 1918 act, was it not?
"MR. STAM. That is true.
"MR. McCORMACK. Out of which arose many thousands of court
cases.
"MR. STAM. That Is true. Over 10,000 cases were litigated, some of
which have not yet been disposed of."
91. H. R. 10413.
92. L R. Rep. 3002, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 50, 52.
93. Int. Rev. Code HU 718 and 720; Second Revenue Act of 1940, HI 718 and
720.
94. Int. Rev. Code § 719; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 719.
95. Memorandum, Advantages of the Invested Capital Concept Con-
tained in the Current Excess-Profits Proposal Over [s4c] the Invested Capital
Concept Contained In [sic] the Revenue Act of 1918, Joint Hearings Re-
port, supra note 3, at 94, 95.
96. Int. Rev. Code U 713(b); Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 713(b), as
amended (in matters not relevant to the present citation) by Excess Profits
Tax Amendments of 1941, § 4.
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required special assessment under the earlier acts,97 but testimony
at the joint hearing9 8 soon revealed many situations of potential
inequity. 9 The demand for a flexible relief provision0 0 resulted
in amendment by the Senate, adding two new sections which
were subsequently accepted by the conference committee and
designated Sections 721 and 722.101
The first of these sections listed six specific situations in
which income for the taxable year'0 2 should be considered ab-
normal; the second was an abnormalities section as brief and
broad as any that can be conceived, simply declaring:
"For the purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner
shall also have authority to make such adjustments as may be
necessary to adjust abnormalities affecting income or capital,
and his decision shall be subject to review by the United
States Board of Tax Appeals."'13
Apparently this would include not only abnormalities affect-
ing income or capital in the computation of the excess profits
credit, but also abnormalities in the income for the taxable year,
and to that extent it offered a duplicate or alternative remedy to
the one supplied by Section 721. In all probability, the juris-
prudence with regard to court review developed under Section
327 (d) of the 1918 and 1921 Acts' °4 would have been applied
here;10 5 and the former Board of Tax Appeals authorities0 "
would have been revived for the determination of abnormalities,
except insofar as the absence of the specific limitations of the
earlier statute 7 might be construed to have liberalized the relief
97. See pp. 668-669, supra.
98. Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3.
99. See id. at 62 et seq., 65-66, 89-90, 103-104, 115-119, 125-128, 163 et seq.,
175 et seq., 203 et seq., 212, 214-215, 217-218, 218-227, 238-241, 241-242,
245-247, 259, 260-262, 271.
100. Id. at 162, 246, 262.
101. H.R. Rep. 3002, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 50-52
102. Int. Rev. Code § 721; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 721. These
situations are considered infra p. 687.
103. Int. Rev. Code § 722, Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 722.
104. See supra pp. 674-.678.
105. The abolition of comparatives as the basis for determining an ab-
normality and computing the tax under special assessment removes the basis
upon which the Supreme Court distinguished review of special assessment
determinations from other discretionary tax problems [see Williamsport
Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551, 559, 48 S.Ct. 587, 589, 72 L.Ed.
985, 987 (1928)]; but this is a slight hurdle for a court which 'could reconcile
the Wifliamsport decision with the language it used as the basis for its
decision in Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220, 48 S.Ct. 87, 72 L.Ed.
249 (1927). See note 40, supra.
106. See pp. 678-684, supra.
107. The requirements (1) that the abnormality result in "exceptional
1941]
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provision. The last clause, "and [the commissioner's] decision
shall be subject to review by the United States Board of Tax
Appeals," resolved the question which led to the protracted liti-
gation of the Oesterlein case;' but it posed the new question,
whether it extended the board's jurisdiction to cases in which
no deficiency is alleged. 10 9
But all this is now of academic interest. Section 722 was en-
acted with the understanding "that the Treasury and members
of the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
will give further study to the entire problem covered by this
section and will report to the appropriate committees on the
subject as soon as possible." 10 On March 7, 1941, Sections 721
and 722 were repealed retroactively."'-
The substituted provisions took the form of a seventeen-
section act' 12 radically revising the excess profits tax statute of
the preceding year. Changes in the basic structure of the tax"'
may be expected to narrow the field of "hardship cases" material-
ly; three sections deal respectively with abnormalities in deduc-
tions during the base period, abnormalities in income of the
taxable year, and abnormalities of income during the base period.
The result is a mixture of specific provisions and specific limita-
tions and broad administrative discretion in a complexity that is
marvellous to behold but exasperating to construe.
This can be accepted, if the provisions accomplish their
intended task: to relieve taxpayers affected by abnormalities, yet
to safeguard the remedy from abuse. But will they adequately
discharge this function?
Section 721114 is devoted to abnormalities in the income for
the taxable year caused by inclusion of items which are attribu-
hardship" as evidenced by "gross disproportion" of the claimant's tax as
compared with representative corporations; (2) that less than 50% of the
claimant's gross income have been derived on a cost-plus basis from gov-
ernment contracts made during the war period.
108. See p. 683 and note 87, supra.
109. Contrast Pittsburgh Supply Co., 14 B.T.A. 620, 621 (1928). Int. Rev.
Code § 732, added by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, §9, clearly
extends the jurisdiction of the board to review or refund claims in special
assessment cases (see infra, p. 703); how does this affect the determina-
tion of the question under Section 722 of the Second Revenue Act of 1940?
110. H. R. Rep. 3002, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 52; H. R. Rep. 146, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2.
111. Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 17. H. R. Rep. 146, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2.
112. Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941.
113. See H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). These matters are
beyond the scope of this article.
114. Int. Rev. Code § 721; Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, §5.
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table, in whole or in part, to other years. The six specific classes of
such income enumerated in Section 721 of the 1940 statute are
carried over to the amended Section 721 (a) (2):
"(A) Income arising out of a claim, award, judgment, or
decree, or interest on any of the foregoing;1 1 5 or
"(B) Income constituting an amount payable under a con-
tract the performance of which required more than 12
months;" ' or
"(C) Income resulting from exploration, discovery, pros-
pecting, research, or development of tangible property, pat-
ents, formulae, or processes, or any combination of the
foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months;117
or
"(D) Income includible in gross income for the taxable
year rather than for a different taxable year by reason of a
change in the taxpayer's accounting period or method of ac-
counting;"1 8 or
"(E) In the case of a lessor of real property, income
included in gross income for the taxable year by reason of
the termination of the lease; 1" 9 or
"(F) Income consisting of dividends on stock of foreign
corporations, except foreign personal holding companies.'12 0
These specific provisions were made to provide for those ab-
normalities which Congress could foresee, and at the same time
to avoid the necessity of administrative selection-which had
provoked so much criticism under the earlier acts-in a majority
of the cases which might arise. Yet Congress sensibly admitted
that "the types of abnormal income that may occur cannot be
115. Compare Trojan Oil Co., 26 B.T.A. 659 (1932). Cf. Welch v. Obispo
Oil Co., 301 U.S. 190, 57 S.Ct. 684, 81 L.Ed. 1033 (1937). Contrast Fort Pitt
Bridge Works, 24 B.T.A. 626 (1931). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.721-2.
116. Possible source: Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 162. Cf.
Red Salmon Canning Co., 15 B.T.A. 790 (1929); L.O. 1109, 1-2 Cum. Bu!l. 253
(1922). Contrast Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 24 B.T.A. 626 (1931). Cf. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 109, §30.721-3.
117. Possible source: Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 115 et seq.
Compare J. G. Curtis Leather Co., 13 B.T.A. 1259 (1928); L.O. 1109, 1-2 Cum.
Bull. 253 (1922). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, §30.721-4.
118. Possible source: Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 152-154. Cf.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 109, §30.721-5.
119. Compare L.O. 1109, 1-2 Cum. Bull. 253 (1922). Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg.
109, §30.721-6. Cf. also U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-13, amended by T.
D. 4980, 1940-28, Int. Rev. Bull. 2, after the decision of Helvering v. Bruun,
309 U.S. 461, 60 S.Ct. 631, 84 L.Ed. 864 (1940).
120. Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, §30.721-7.
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predicted in advance, '121 and so provided further that "the classi-
fication of income of any class not described in subparagraphs
(A) to (F), inclusive, shall be subject to regulations prescribed
by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary."
122
Power was delegated to the commissioner, that is, to add further
subdivisions to Section 721 (a) (2) as the need might arise; but
the action will be quasi legislative in effect, and the ruling once
established will be available to other taxpayers, rather than
quasi judicial (as under the earlier acts) with the possibility of
diverse results on the same set of essential facts.123 This may be
expected to preclude some of the suggestions of favoritism and
discrimination which were heard under the former arrangement.
Unfortunately, this necessarily prevents the application of special
relief in those cases in which the abnormality is a combination
of factors no one of which alone would suffice. 124
Relief is not applied, of course, merely upon a showing that
the claimant has income of the indicated classes; it must appear
that it is abnornal for the taxpayer to receive income of this
class or in this amount, 25 and that it is attributable to other
years.1 26 The latter is, as applied to abnormalities of gross income
for the taxable year, an elementary requirement of necessity;
for abnormally large income attributable to the taxable year is
the very incidence of the tax. This limitation is merely the appli-
cation to one type of abnormality of the rule under the 1918 and
1921 Acts that special relief should not be granted "in any case
in which the tax ... is high merely because the corporation
earned within the taxable year a high rate of profit upon a
normal invested capital.'"
It may theoretically be an abnormal condition for a tax-
payer to receive regularly income of the same class attributable
to years other than that in which it is credited; but if the sums
are substantially the same from year to year, correction would be
a useless effort: Deduction of sums includible in gross income of
121. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) 9.
122. Int. Rev. Code § 721(a)(2).
123. Contrast, for example, Kimball Tyler Co. of Maryland, 18 B.T.A.
729 (1930) with Bates-Bowman Corp., 20 B.T.A. 460 (1930) and San Francisco
Hotel Co., 22 B.T.A. 740 (1931). Cf. Continental Products Co., 24 B.T.A. 119
(1931).
124. Cf. E. B. Ficklen Tobacco Co., 10 B.T-.A 51 (1928).
125. H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Seas. (1941) 9-10.
126. Int. Rev. Code I 721(c); H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)
10.
127. Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, §327(d), 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42
Stat. 275 (1923). For the Board of Tax Appeals' application of this limitation,
see supra p. 682.
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the taxable year but attributable to other years would be offset
by addition of sums includible in other years but actually earned
in the taxable year. Such a taxpayer suffers little if the income
received during each year is taxed arbitrarily as if it were
attributable to activities of that year. But if it is unusual, or
abnormal, for the taxpayer to receive income of this class, it
should be taxed only upon the portion of the income which is
properly attributable to the taxable year. The same is true of the
excess portion when the taxpayer regularly receives such income,
but during the taxable year has received it in an abnormally
large amount.
This problem was disposed of under the 1918 and 1921 Acts by
the vague standard that the abnormality must cause "exceptional
hardship" as evidenced by "gross disproportion" between the
tax owned by the claimant under the ordinary scale and that paid
by representative corporations12 "as nearly as may be, similarly
circumstanced. ' 129 In the 1941 statute Congress has sought to
avoid the uncertainty of the former criterion' " by providing,
very specifically, that income of a class which the taxpayer
normally receives shall not be considered abnormal in amount
unless it exceeds 125 per cent of the average amount of the gross
income of the same class received during the four previous tax-
able years, or such portion of that time as the taxpayer was in
existence.13 ' Here Congress has chosen definiteness at the sacri-
fice of flexibility, making possible the obvious disparity in the
following hypothetical case:
X Corporation and Y Corporation are identical in structure
and services rendered; each regularly receives $100,000 per year
from judgments entirely attributable to previous years, and
$100,000 per year from long-term contracts performed in previous
years. Both make their returns on the cash basis. During 1940
each experiences a twenty per cent increase of gross receipts
from these two sources; but X Corporation's increase is uniform,
128. Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, § 327(d), 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42
Stat. 275 (1923).
129. Id. at § 328(a), 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42 Stat. 275 (1923). For ap-
plication of this limitation under the 1918 and 1921 acts, see supra p. 682.
130. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Bess. (1941) 5.
131. Int. Rev. Code § 721(a)(1). Note that the test here is the average
for the four previous taxable years, not the base period of four fixed years
(1936-1939) used for determination of the excess profits credit on income
basis. Id. at § 713(b)(1)(A); Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, §4.
Compare Section 713(b)(1)(B), making a similiar provision for computation
of the excess profits credit on income basis for a corporation in existence
during only part of the forty-eight months preceding the beginning of its
first taxable year; but see note 175, infra.
A corporation organized after December 31, 1939, and receiving during its
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whereas Y Corporation's increase is concentrated in the "judg-
ments" class.
X Corp. Y Corp.
Average income from judgments during
four previous taxable years $100,000 $100,000
Average income from long-term contracts
during four previous taxable years 100,000 100,000
Income from judgments during 1940 120,000 140,000
Income from long-term contracts
during 1940 120,000 100,000
Total income for 1940 $240,000 $240,000
On this highly-idealized record, it is apparent that each had
$40,000 of abnormal income during 1940. Y Corporation can, in
fact, secure reduction of its 1940 income from judgments by the
difference between $140,000 and $125,000 (125% of $100,000, the
average of four previous years), but X Corporation's income in
both brackets is below 125 per cent of its average income from
the same sources, and therefore is not "abnormal" within the
statutory test. Assuming that the excess profits credit for each is
$195,000, and disregarding deductions, 132 the result is:
X Corp. Y Corp.
Income for 1940 $240,000 $240,000
Minus net abnormal income attributable
to other years'33  0 15,000
$240,000 $225,000
Minus excess profits credit and exemption' 3 4 $200,000 $200,000
Adjusted excess profits net income subject
to tax for 1940 $ 40,000 $ 25,000
first year of existence income of one of the indicated classes, includible in
gross income for 1940 but attributable in whole or in part to future years,
would have no "previous taxable years" upon which to determine an average
for the purposes of the 125 per cent rule. Would it be considered "abnormal
for the taxpayer to derive income of such class," in which event the 125
per cent limitation would be inapplicable? If so, the result may be entirely
unrealistic; for example, the corporation may be a new construction com-
pany which has received advance payment for performance of a construc-
tion contract during 1940 and 1941, and which is intended to execute long-
term contracts, the income to be reported on the completed contract basis
in accordance with U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, §19.42-4(b). If not, Section 721 will
offer no relief to corporations formed after December 31, 1939, during the
first year of corporate existence.
132. This hypothesis is worked out in extremely simplified and skeletal
form; computation of relief is considered in greater detail infra, p. 705.133. See Int. Rev. Code § 721(c). If the previous year were subsequent to
December 31, 1939, there woulld be an additional tax under Section 721(c)(2).
Sed infra, pp. 703-704.
134. See Int. Rev. Code § 710(b); Second Revenue Act of 1940, 5 710(b).
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But criticism is easy; any figure which Congress could fix
would be susceptible to similar treatment, and the discrimination
is no more serious than that between employers of eight or more
persons, who are subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax, and
those who employ fewer and are exempt. 8 5 A more serious ques-
tion is whether the 125 per cent figure is too high to permit
alleviation of many real abnormalities, or so low that the Bureau
of Internal Revenue will be deluged with applications; and that
is essentially a matter of personal opinion, upon which only
future events can cast light.13 6 Congress must accept the evils of
inflexibility to avoid the evils of flexibility.
Congress found it inadvisable, however, to devise a me-
chanical means of determining to what previous or future year
income of this kind should be attributed, and in what amount;
this it left to future regulations of the commissioner with the
approval of the secretary.""7 The hypothetical case suggested was
simplified by the assumption that all income in question was at-
tributable to previous years not subject to excess profits taxa-
tion, 88 but in the normal case there will be the compound problem
of determining (a) the amount of such income attributable to
the taxable year (which will, of course, be included in the excess
profits net income subject to tax); (b) the amount to be attrib-
uted to previous years and its allocation among those years,
some of which will ordinarily be subject to the excess profits
tax;1 89 and (c) the amount to be attributed to future years, and
to which years. 140
One further point remains: 11 The statute provides that, "All
the income which is classifiable in more than one of such sub-
paragraphs shall be classified under the one which the taxpayer
irrevocably elects.11 42 This rigorous rule of pleading was prob-
ably intended to prevent amendments by taxpayers seeking to
evade the 125 per cent limitation; but many meritorious claims
135. Int. Rev. Code § 1607(a), 53 Stat. 1392 (1939).
136. See H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13.
137. Int. Rev. Code § 721(b). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, §30.721 (promul-
gated previous to the 1941 amendments, but probably still valid with regard
to attribution of abnormal income under Section 721).
138. Also by eliminating from consideration expenses entailed in the
earning of such income, and by treating gross income and net income as
Identical. See infra, p. 705 et seq., for detailed consideration of these factors.
139. See Int. Rev. Code § 721(c) (2).
140. See Id. at § 721(d).
141. For relief to be granted under this and other sections, see infra,
p. 705 et seq.
142. Int. Rev. Code § 721(a)(2).
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may be forfeited for failure to select the proper name by which
the rose should be called. This does not necessarily imply neg-
ligence; neither courts nor boards are noted for their invariable
acceptance of the construction which seemed reasonable before
the measure reached their hands.
With this exception, however, Congress may be said to have
performed a creditable job in its handling of abnormalities affect-
ing gross income of the taxable year. The rest will depend upon
sympathetic administration.
But it should be noted that the six classes of income desig-
nated, and those which the commissioner is empowered to pre-
scribe by regulation, refer exclusively to abnormal gross income
received. 14 There is no provision for the correlative factor-ab-
normally low expenditures which result in high net income."4
Assume that the T Company is a small corporation organized
since December 31, 1939,145 and that it is not a.reorganization of a
partnership or proprietorship. 146 In order to build up the capital
of the corporation, the managers (who are the sole stockholders)
agree to accept salaries far below their true worth. The result, of
course, is an abnormally large net return if the corporation earns
even normal gross income. Since there is no provision for the
adjustment of such an abnormality,'41 T Company must pay an
excess profits tax although it actually has only normal profits,
and although an identical corporation forced to hire outside
143. See id. at § 721(a)(1). Cf. II(A) of the outline of abnormalities, supra
p. 671.
144. See 1I(B) of the outline of abnormalities, supra p. 671.
145. This is assumed to avoid possible application of Int. Rev. Code § 722,
as amended by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 6, although that
section is confined to adjustment of the excess profits credit on income basis
(H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 10).
See infra note 146.
146. This is assumed to avoid Int. Rev. Code § 742, as construed by refer-
ence to Section 740, as both are amended by Excess Profits Tax Amendments
of 1941, § 8.
If the corporation could secure the benefit of an excess profits credit
computed on income basis (either under these sections or because it had an
actual earnings record during the base years), and if comparably low sal-
aries were also paid during the whole of the base period, the resulting
abnormally high excess profits credit would cancel the abnormally high
income for the taxable year, and no prejudice would result. This problem
arises either when the corporation is forced to adopt the capital basis excess
profits credit (as under the facts given), or when the determination to build
up capital by this device is made late in or after the base period.
147. Int. Rev. Code § 721 does not apply because (a) it is not "income
of any class includible in the gross income of the taxpayer" under Section
721(a)(1), and (b) it is not attributable to any other year.
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managers of similar ability, and at their "market value," would
have no tax to pay."8
The statute also lacks any provision for relief of abnormal-
ities affecting the excess profits credit computed on the capital
basis, such as has been a feature of every excess profits act since
February, 1919. If the concept of invested capital has been per-
fected to the point that no abnormalities can arise, this omission
was proper; but the committee itself points out in its report on
the 1941 amendments that abnormalities are diverse and unpre-
dictable.-49 Relief of capital abnormalities is unnecessary, also, if
adequate provision has been made for adjustment of the excess
profits credit based on prior income to the situation of every tax-
payer in every conceivable case; in fact, the capital basis of
computation would then become useless except as a means
whereby overcapitalized corporations can avoid the purpose of
the statute. But has this ideal been attained under the 1941
amendments?
"Section 722 of the bill," said the report of the Committee on
Wpys and Means, "is designed to afford relief in the case of
certain situations not covered by other sections'of the bill."10
From this it would be expected that the provision would be quite
broad, covering all those points of the outline of abnormalities
above' 5 except II (A). But "The relief is confined to the adjust-
148. This type of abnormality was quite common under the 1918 and 1921
acts, which required all corporations to compute the excess profits credit on
an invested capital basis. A few of the cases in which the Board of Tax
Appeals granted special assessment because of inadequate salaries paid in
a close-held corporation were Yale-Brevda Paper Box Manufacturing Co.,
2 B.T.A. 900 (1925); Sol Frankel, Inc., 3 B.T.A. 494 (1926); Saner-Ragley
Lumber Co., 3 B.T.A. 927 (1926); Selwyn Operating Co., 5 B.T.A. 723 (1926); G.
Angelo Co., 12 B.T.A. 460 (1928). For the requisites of establishing inade-
quacy of salaries, consult Crowley Bros., Inc., 2 B.T.A. 477 (1925); Warren
County Fertilizer Co., 17 B.T.A. 113 (1929); Green, Matthews, Taylor Co., 19
B.T.A. 359 (1930).
Low expenses during the taxable year were relieved as the result of
abnormalities when the corporation had leases at low rental from an affilt-
ated corporation [San Francisco Hotel Co., 22 B.T.A. 740 (1931) ], a parent cor-
poration [California Coast Oil Co., 25 B.T.A. 902 (1932)], or a sole stockholder
[Bates-Bowman Corp., 20 B.T.A. 460 (1930)]. Apparently contra: Kimball
Tyler Co. of Maryland, 18 B.T.A. 729 (1930). Cf. Standard Slag Co., 20 B.T.A.
503 (1930). Ordinarily, however, special assessment was not granted because
of advantageous relationships enabling the taxpayer to obtain the benefit of
reduced costs [Continental Products Co., 24 B.T.A. 119 (1931)], and advan-
tageous contracts for the purchase of raw materials were not considered
abnormal [Everett Logging Co., 19 B.T.A. 1098 (1930)]. But cf. A.R.R. 518,
4 Cum. Bull. 401 (1921).
149. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2, 3, 9.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Supra pp. 668-671. Int. Rev. Code § 711(b)(1)(H), (I), (J), and (K)
supplement Section 722. See infra p. 695 et seq.
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ment of the abnormal base period net income of a taxpayer
electing the average earnings credit," 152 and within that category
it applies only to the situations specifically designated.
As was shown in the outline of abnormalities, the excess
profits credit based on prior earnings may be abnormal when
1. the character of the corporation has so materially changed
that the past earnings are not fairly representative of pres-
ent earning power;
2. the corporation experienced abnormally low net earnings
during one or more years of the base period; or
3. the taxpayer corporation is materially prejudiced by the
time of incorporation.
Section 722 (a) (1) provides relief in the first of these in-
stances, but it is applicable only if
"(A) there is a difference in the products or services furn-
ished; or
"(B) there is a difference in the capacity for production or
operation; or
"(C) there is a difference in the ratio of non-borrowed
capital to total capital; or
"(E) the taxpayer acquired, before January 1, 1940, all or
part of the assets of a competitor, with the result that the
competition of such competitor was eliminated or dimin-
ished."'15
These clauses seem sufficiently broad to cover all cases of changes
in the character of any business; but prescience is particularly
difficult in this field. The restrictive "only" was no doubt another
line in the bureau's defenses against too numerous applications,
at the cost of possible individual injustices.
Relief for abnormalities of the second class is supplied by
Section 722 (a) (2), when the taxpayer "establishes ... that in
one or more of the taxable years in [the] base period normal
production, output, or operation was interrapted or diminished
because of the occurrence of events abnormal in the case of such
taxpayer."'' 5 4 This clause, fortunately, is left more general than
the preceding one; the committee has indicated that it is intended
to apply when the taxpayer has experienced a fire, flood, or
154. Int. Rev. Code § 722(a) (2).
152. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 10.




strike' 5 interrupting or diminishing operations during the base
period, 15 6 but application in other instances is wisely left open.
The effectiveness of Section 722 (a) (2) in correcting abnor-
malities resulting in low income during the base period will
depend in large measure upon the strictness or liberality with
which the interruption-of-operation clause is construed. Suppose
that the Z Company publishes a daily newspaper, suspension of
which was threatened by a flood which disabled its plant during a
base period year. It was able to secure the use of another press and
continued uninterruptedly to produce and sell the same number
of newspapers; but the small capacity of the emergency press
compelled omission of the advertising which is Z Company's chief
source of revenue. Would this be an interruption or diminution
of "normal production, output, or operation"? Clearly it must be,
if the purpose of the section is to be effectuated.
If the taxpayer brings itself within the terms of Section
722 (a) (1) or (2), it has established that it is affected by ab-
normal conditions; but that alone does not entitle it to relief.
It must show that the excess profits credit computed under this
section is greater than that ascertained under the ordinary pro-
visions of the statute; 15 and to establish this the taxpayer must
prove "the amount that would have been its average base period
net income" if the character of its business had been the same
during the base period, and if none of the abnormal events had
occurred. 158 A more difficult burden of proof can scarcely be im-
agined; it is like answering the old nonsense, "If you don't have
a brother, would he like chocolate ice cream if you did?" The
taxpayer must prove that abnormal conditions existed which
diminished its base-period earnings, and then it must establish
what those earnings would have been if the conditions had not
existed-which can rarely be more than an informed guess.
This will be considered at greater length in the discussion of
the relief to be granted, in connection with which the problem
also arises. 5 9
155. Compare Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 12 B.T.A. 1024 (1928),
affirmed 59 F.(2d) 914 (1932).
156. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 12.
157. Int. Rev. Code § 722(a)(4). Compare the rule established by the
Board of Tax Appeals under the earlier acts that special assessment may
not be applied unless the resulting tax is lower than that determined under
the ordinary provisions.
158. And "if in each of such taxable years none of the items of gross
Income had been abnormally large, and none of the items of deductions had
been abnormally small . . . ." [Int. Rev. Code § 721(a)(3)].
159. See infra, p. 710 et seq.
1941]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
A further limitation upon the application of Section 722 is
that the "high prices of materials, labor, capital, or any other
agent or production, low selling price of the product of the tax-
payer, or low physical volume of sales owing to low demand for
such product or for the output of the taxpayer, shall not be
considered as abnormal."' 160 These are the "normal" variants of
the capitalist economy-supply and demand; but the limitation
seems unduly broad. Any of these factors may be abnormal
when caused by abnormal conditions; yet relief under Section
722 apparently is precluded in such circumstances as these:
1. The newspaper publisher instanced above was able to
secure a press adequate to continue normal operations during
the flood, but was compelled to pay a high rental for the use of
the emergency equipment.
2. A taxpayer manufacturing semi-finished goods experi-
enced "low physical volume of sales owing to low demand for
such product" during the base period because of strikes which
closed many of the finishing plants which constitute its restricted
market,
3. The taxpayer purchased its raw materials during the base
period years under a disadvantageous contract stipulating a price
in excess of market value. The contract has expired, and it is
able to purchase on the open market, and thus has a greater net
income although its production and the sale price of %ts product
remain the same.161
4. The taxpayer introduced a new product in 1936, which it
sold at a loss during the base period year to introduce the com-
modity to the public. Having built up a market, the taxpayer
has now raised the price and is earning a substantial profit on
the same volume of sales and with the same costs.
In any event, it may be doubted that in examples (1), (3),
and (4) "normal production, output, or operation was interrupted
or diminished because of the occurrence of events abnormal in
the case of such taxpayer" under Section 722 (a) (2); and certain-
ly in none of these situations is there a change in the character
of the business sufficient to bring it within Section 722 (a) (1).
160. Int. Rev. Code § 722(b)(1).
161. But cf. A.R.R. 338, 3 Cum. Bull. 363 (1920), denying special assessment
sought because of inefficient management during the prewar period. If this
was alleged as an abnormality affecting the war profits tax credit [see
Excess Profits Tax of 1918, § 311, 40 Stat. 1090 (1919); L. 0. 1DOO-A, 2 Cum.
Bull. 299 (1920)], it would indicate a refusal of relief under the facts of the
hYPMthesis; but the exact basis of A.R.R. 388 is not clearly shown.
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The taxpayer in the fourth hypothesis, however, could obtain
some measure of relief under Section 733;182 and relief should be
granted the taxpayer in both the latter two examples, as having
sustained abnormal deductions during the base period, under Sec-
tion 711.163 But there is no such recourse for the taxpayer in the
second example.
Adjustment under Section 722 is also denied unless the tax
computed under the ordinary provisions exceeds six per cent of
the taxpayer's normal-tax net income for the year, and unless
the application of the section would diminish the tax otherwise
payable by at least ten per cent.10 4 These limitations were includ-
ed to limit the number of cases for administrative consideration,
with the understanding that they might be reduced if experience
proved them too high.1 5
By analogy to the 1918 and 1921 Acts, the burden -of proof
will probably be placed upon the taxpayer to allege and prove
that the effect of the relief will be greater than the percentages
indicated, and to negative Section 722 (b) (1).11
The discussion so far has been of diminution of the base
162. The Board of Tax Appeals frequently granted special assessment
when valuable good will was excluded from statutory invested capital under
the 1918 and 1921 acts. Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B.T.A. 1192 (1928);
Farnsworth, Hoyt Co., 16 B.T.A. 309 (1929); Thomas B. Moreland Co., 16
B.T.A. 858 (1929). But cf. Raymond Syndicate, Inc., 21 B.T.A. 600 (1930)
(special assessment not to be granted when the good will was developed
only incidentally by advertising intended primarily to sell the taxpayer's
goods). Int. Rev. Code § 733, Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 10,
now permits taxpayers to capitalize past expenditures for the promotion of
good will, thus fictitiously reducing the deductions and increasing the net
income of the years in question; the taxpayer is then required to pay the
additional income tax which would have been due had these sums been
charged to the capital account instead of deducted as business expenses in
the years they were expended. Int. Rev. Code § 734, Excess Profits Tax
Amendments of 1941, § 11. It was probably lack of such a provision which
led to administrative nonacquiescence in such cases as Marc Eidlitz &
Son, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 187 (1929). See IX-2 Cum. Bull. 72 (1930).
The method of "ascertainment of Amount of Adjustment" prescribed
by Section 734(d) would not appear, however, to avoid a companion difficulty
which resulted in special assessments under the earlier acts: impossibility
of determining the amount of such expenditures which should be capitalized.
Northwestern Yeast Co., 5 B.T.A. 232 (1926); Conrad & Co., 13 B.T.A. 1332
(1928); George W. Caswell Co., 14 B.T.A. 15 (1928). The taxpayer was
required to show, however, that its capital was not small simply because
it had not taken the trouble to establish a larger amount. Union Drawn
Steel Co., 15 B.T.A. 761 (1929). Cf. Enameled Metals Co., 14 B.T.A. 1392
(1929), a rule which may be applied under Section 733. Cf. Int. Rev. Code §
723; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 723.
163. See infra p. 698 et seq.
164. Int. Rev. Code § 722(c). Compare the rule under the earlier acts
that the effect of the abnormality must be substantW.
165. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13.
166. See supra p. 682.
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period net income by abnormalities reducing the gross receipts
during that period. The net income may similarly be affected by
abnormally high expenses. Nothing in the "General Rule" of
Section 722 (a) (2) would appear to prevent its application when
interruption or diminution of normal operations lowered net in-
come during the base period because of increased expenses, but
this type of abnormality ordinarily is not so caused; and, as was
shown in the three hypotheses last given, the limitations of Sec-
tion 722 make its application impossible in many instances of
abnormal deductions. Section 711 (b) (1) (H), (I), (J) and. (K),16
however, permits adjustment of abnormal deductions during the
base period, when it is abnormal for the taxpayer to have income
of this class, or if the income of that class exceeded 125 per cent
of the average amount of such deductions in the four previous
taxable years.168 Two classes of abnormal deductions-payment
of judgments, claims, awards, or decrees,'69 and intangible drill-
ing and development costs' 0-- are specified in the statute, and
other classifications may be made by regulations prescribed by
the commissioner with approval of the secretary.'1 ' Deductions
will not be adjusted "unless the taxpayer establishes that the
abnormality or excess is not a consequence of an increase of the
gross income of the taxpayer in its base period or a decrease in
the amount of some other deduction in its base period, and is not
a consequence of a change at any time in the type, manner of
operation, size, or condition of the business engaged in by the
taxpayer."'"
These provisions are the correlative of Section 722 (a) (2),
but in form they are closely analogous to Section 721.18 The dis-
cussion of the latter section is applicable here, except that there
is no requirement of "irrevocable election" nor that the expendi-
tures deducted be attributable to another year, and the provision
for taxpayers which have not been in existence during four pre-
vious taxable years is somewhat different.'7'
167. Added by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 3.
168. Int. Rev. Code § 711(b)(1)(H),(I), and (J)(ii). Compare Section 721(a) (1).169. Id. at § 711(b) (1) (H). Compare Section 721(a) (2) (A).
170. Id. at § 711(b)(1)(I). Compare Section 721(a)(2)(C).
171. Id. at § 711(b)(1)(J). Compare last sentence of Section 721(a)(2).
172. Id. at § 711(b)(1)(K)(ii).
178. See supra notes 168, 169, 170, and 171.
174. If the taxpayer was not in existence for four previous taxable years,
Section 711(b) (1) (K) (I) provides for the addition, to those previous taxable
years during which the taxpayer was in existence, of succeeding taxable
years which begin before the beginning of the taxpayer's second taxable
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Despite the criticisms which have been offered, Section 722
[as complemented by Section 711(b) (1) (H), (I), (J), and (K)]
with sympathetic administration, will probably offer adequate
relief in the great majority of instances in which the excess
profits credit determined under the normal base-period computa-
tion is inapplicable because of changes in the character of the
enterprise, or because of occurrences abnormally diminishing the
base period net income.
But what of corporations prejudiced by the time of incor-
poration? Section 722 (b) (2) (D) directs that existence during
only part of the base period shall be considered a change in the
character of the business, so corporations organized in the several
years before January 1, 1940,175 are entitled to the benefits of that
year under the subchapter, until a maximum of four is attained. A cor-
poration organized on January 2, 1935, and filing its returns on the calendar
year basis, in complaining of an abnormal deduction in 1938 would compute
its averages from the years 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1989; the same corporation,
if organized on January 2, 1937, could use only 1937, 1939, and 1940 (the last
succeeding taxable year which begins before the beginning of its second
taxable year under the statute).
Section 721 is devoted to abnormalities affecting income of the current
taxable year and, since conditions in "succeeding taxable years" cannot be
known at the time the return is filed, no corresponding provision can be
applied. Section 721(a) (1) stipulates that "if the taxpayer was not in exist-
ence for four previous taxable years, the taxable years during which the
taxpayer was in existence" shall determine the average.
175. Int. Rev. Code § 713(b) (1); Excess Profits Tax Amendments of
1941, § 4:
"(b) Base Period.-
"(1) Definition.-As used in this section the term 'base period'-
"(A) If the corporation was in existence during the whole of the
forty-eight months preceding the beginning of its first taxable year
under this subchapter, means the period commencing with the be-
ginning of its first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1935,
and ending with the close of its last taxable year beginning before
January 1, 1940; and
"(B) In the case of a corporation which was in existence during
only part of the forty-eight months preceding the beginning of its
first taxable year under this subchapter, means the forty-eight
months preceding the beginning of its first taxable year under this
subchapter."
If a corporation is organized and begins operations after December 31,
1939, however, its "first taxable year under this subchapter" begins imme-
diately. Even if it intends regularly to file returns on the basis of a fiscal
year beginning a fractional year after the date of organization, it must file
a return for that fractional period (cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.52-1) and
this period apparently would be considered a "taxable year" [cf. Int. Rev.
Code § 48(a), 53 Stat. 26 (1939)]; it is necessarily a "taxable year beginning
after December 31, 1939," and therefore subject to the excess profits tax
under Section 710, and consequently is the "first taxable year under this sub-
chapter" [nt. Rev. Code § 713(b)(1)(B)]. A corporation organized after
December 31, 1939, therefore, could not have been in existence during any
"part of the forty-eight months preceding the beginning of its first taxable
year under this subchapter," and Section 718(b)(1)(B) apparently would be
inapplicable; and the same would be true of Section 722 (b) (2) (D). This con-
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section. Neither Section 722 nor Section 711 can apply, however,
to corporations organized after December 31, 1939,17" unless they
are "acquiring corporations" under Section 740; such enterprises
are forced to rely upon the capital basis computation of the
excess profits credit.177 Since there is no provision for adjustment
of the excess profits credit so determined, these corporations may
suffer a very real prejudice at a critical stage of development.
The most obvious example is an enterprise of such high risk
that a return in excess of eight per cent 1 8 is necessary. Corpora-
tions organized to discover and develop new mineral deposits
elusion is in accord with the specific provision of Section 712(a), that all
domestic corporations other than those in existence before January 1, 1940,
must compute their excess profits credits under Section 714 (capital basis).
The limitation is even more stringent with regard to foreign corporations.
See note 177, infra.
Accepting this, what was the purpose of rephrasing Section 713(b), para-
graph (1) of the Second Revenue Act of 1940, which applied the base period
of the present Section 713(b) (1) (A), into the apparently dichotomous sub-
paragraphs, Section 713(b) (1) (A) and (B), of Section 4 of the 1941 amend-
ments (quoted above)? (1) If the corporation was not in existence before
January 1, 1940, it cannot avail itself of Section 713; and this is true even
if it is an "acquiring corporation" (Int. Rev. Code § 741). (2) If the cor-
poration was in existence before January 1, 1941, the "forty-eight months
preceding. the beginning of its first taxable year" under the excess profits
tax will necessarily coincide with the period indicated in Section 713(b)(1)(A) as the base for corporations in existence during the whole forty-eight
months. 1,
But even if Section 713(b)(1)(B) does apply to corporations organized
after December 31, 1939, such a corporation has no actual earnings record
during any part of the indicated forty-eight months, and must compile its
"income basis" excess profits credit entirely under the assumptions of Section
713(d) (2)-which is substantially the same as the capital basis excess profits
credit.
A corporation which is an "acquiring corporation" under the definition
of Section 740 may determine its average base period net income under §
742 (as both sections are amended by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of
1941, § 8) but may not elect computation under Section 713 unless it was itself
in existence prior to January 1, 1940 (Int. Rev. Code § 741; U. S. Treas. Reg.
109, § 30.741-1).
176. The exact language of Section 722(a) merely restricts the relief to
taxpayers "whose first taxable year under this subchapter begins in 1940,"
which would apply to all corporations subject to the tax 'which began oper-
ations before January 1, 1941. However, Section 722 is of benefit only to cor-
porations computing the excess profits credit on the income basis, and
domestic corporations organized after December 31, 1938, must adopt the
capital basis computation (Int. Rev. Code § 712) unless they are "acquiring
corporations" within the meaning of Section 740, as amended by Section 8
of the 1941 amendments. The same thing is true of Section 711(b)(1)(H),
(I), (J), and (K).
177. Section 721(a), as amended by Excess Profits Tax Amendments of
1941, § 13. This is with regard to domestic corporations; a foreign corpora-
tion is required to adopt the capital basis unless it was in existence and
doing business or maintaining an office in the United States for the full
forty-eight months prior to the beginning of its first taxable year under the
statute. Section 712(b).
178. See Int. Rev. Code § 714.
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usually fail; accordingly those which succeed must pay for those
which fail, in addition to yielding a fair return, else the hazard
would be so "loaded" that intelligent investors, however specu-
latively inclined, could not be attracted. If the successful enter-
prises of this kind are to be heavily taxed upon their income
above eight per cent, new ventures will be greatly discouraged.
Congress was sufficiently impressed by this argument" to grant
special exemption to corporations engaged in the mining of
minerals considered necessary for strategic purposes; 180 but only
seven minerals are listed."i '
The risk ratio varies, however, with every type of enter-
prise;182 and although it might theoretically be desirable to
adjust the excess profits credit computed on the capital basis to
the true economic normal return of each taxpayer, the vague-
ness and variability of such factors ordinarily renders their con-
sideration impractical for taxation purposes. 83 Corporations
which must adopt the capital basis and which are subject to a
high degree of risk will be taxed on earnings which are not
excess profits, but this seems to be an unavoidable evil of this
form of taxation.
Many other abnormalities affecting the capital basis excess
profits credit could be alleviated, however, as they were under
the 1918 and 1921 Acts. Perhaps the most common was a high
179. Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 224-227.
180. Int. Rev. Code § 731.
181. Only, gold mining was so favored under the 1918 and 1921 acts
[Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, § 304(c), 40 Stat. 1090 (1919) and 42 Stat.
273 (1923)], and gold is not included in the list of prosaic metals produc-
tion of which is encouraged by the present statute. The old order changeth,
yielding place to Fort Knox.
Section 721(a)(2)(C) should not be considered as offering adequate
relief in the problem suggested. For that provision to apply, (1) the develop-
ment must be related to the particular property out of which the income
arises; and (2) the development must have been by the taxpayer corpora-
tion itself, not by a predecessor (U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.721-4); and (3)
even if the first two conditions are met, the relief is restricted to deduction
of the abnormal income attributable to other years [Int. Rev. Code §
721(c) (1)], and economically the return attributable to the taxable year must
exceed 8%.
182. Dewing, op. cit. supra note 17, at 144-151, 175-177.
183. In extreme cases, the Board of Tax Appeals under the earlier acts
granted special assessment when the corporation's capital was relatively
small and the income was attributed in large part to the personal skill of
the managers. Guarantee Construction Co., 2 B.T.A. 1145 (1925); E.B. Fick-
len Tobacco Co., 10 B.T.A. 51 (1928). These are the dominant factors which,
according to Dewing, necessitate a higher rate of return on the investment
(Dewing, op. cit. supra note 17, at 145-146). If relief is to be granted in
such cases, however, the administering authority must have broad discre-
tion to consider the individual case on its facts, a power which Congress was
reluctant to grant in 1941.
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percentage of borrowed capital, which was not includible in
invested capital under those statutes.'8 ' The Treasury prided
itself upon the improvement in that regard of the capital con-
cept of the present act,'85 yet but one-half of the taxpayers bor-
rowed capital is includible today.18 6 This merely reduced the
degree of discrimination, rather than removing it; a corporation
which has financed itself by bonds and stock in equal portions
will still have but three-fourths the capital basis excess profits
credit of an otherwise identical corporation which has issued
stock alone."'
Another type of abnormality which was relieved under the
earlier acts 188 but which apparently is not provided for today
may be illustrated by a corporation organized after December
31, 1939, as an advertising agency. The principal stockholders
are the active managers of the corporation and most of the
income is attributable to their personal efforts, but they own less
184. Section 326 (b), Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, 40 Stat. 1092 (1919)
and 42 Stat. 275 (1923); U. S. Treas. Reg. 45 and 62, Art. 831.
"Section 327 of the respective Revenue Acts does not specifically provide
that the use of borrowed money in carrying on business creates an abnor-
mality of capital or affects income abnormally. Whether it does or not is
a question of fact to be determined in each case. It is not necessarily true
that such a situation creates an abnormality. We think, however, that where
capital is a material income-producing factor, but where, because of the fact
that the capital employed is in large part borrowed, there is no invested
capital or the invested capital is materially disproportionate to the net
income as compared with representative corporations engaged in a like or
similar trade or business, an abnormality of invested capital is produced
which is clearly contemplated by section 827." G. M. Standifer Construction
Corp., 4 B.T.A. 525, 561 (1926). See also L. 0. 1109, 1-2 Cum. Bull. 253 (1922).
"An inordinately large amount of borrowed funds" was repeatedly applied
as at least one factor indicating the taxpayer was entitled to special assess-
ment [e.g., Saner-Ragley Lumber Co., 3 B.T.A. 927 (1926); Pierce Oil Corp.,
32 B.TAL. 403 (1935)] if the taxpayer showed that its proportion of borrowed
capital was abnorinally large for its business or industry [Higginbotham-
Bailey-Logan Co., 8 B.T.A. 566 (1927)], although it was indicated that this
factor alone would not justify relief [Ferdinand Buedingen Co., Inc., 13
B.T.A. 1065 (1928)] and the taxpayer was not permitted special assessment
if it operated on borrowed funds while it permitted its surplus to lie idle
[see Warren County Fertilizer Co., 17 B.T.A. 113 (1929)] or to be lent to its
officers and principal stockholders [Spiesberger & Son Co., 2 B.T.A. 492
(1925)].
185. Treasury Memoranaum, Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at
94-95.
186. Int. Rev. Code § 719(b).
187. It is difficult to understand the objections to inclusion of all bor-
rowed capital, with disallowance of the deduction of all interest payments
[cf. Int. Rev. Code § 711(a)(2)(B)] which would place corporations employ-
Ing borrowed capital on the same basis as others. Int. Rev. Code § 722(b)
(2) (C) would then be unnecessary.
188. See supra note 183. As was indicated there, this type of abnormality
is really an extreme case of high risk necessitating a return in excess of8%.
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than seventy per cent of the stock. Because of the date of incor-
poration the taxpayer must adopt the capital basis;3 9 the stock
ownership removes it from the very restricted statutory defini-
tion of a personal service corporation; 190 it can secure no relief
under Section 721, for none of its income is attributable to other
than the taxable year. The corporation must therefore submit to
taxation of all earnings above eight per cent on the meager
capital employed in such enterprises. The situation could be
remedied by raising the salaries of the managers, but capital
for such enterprises is difficult to obtain, and the outside stock-
holders will not easily consent to this device even if the corpora-
tion has secured legal advice in time to effect the change for the
first taxable year under a retroactive statute.
Examples could be multiplied, but with little profit. The,
only essentials are (1) that the taxpayer be affected by an abnor-
mality in its capital basis excess profits credit; (2) that there
be no specific exemption applicable; and (3) that the taxpayer be
organized after December 31, 1939.11 The corporate structure of
the nation cannot be solidified as it existed on that date.
The Review of Abnormalities Determinations
Section 732, added by the 1941 amendments,19 2 specifies that
the Board of Tax Appeals shall have jurisdiction to review
determinations under these special assessment provisions. It is
broader than the doctrine of review developed under the earlier
acts,' for refund claims are added to the jurisdictional grant by
the device of considering the commissioner's notice of disallow-
ance of the claim as a deficiency notice for the purpose of assess-
ment and collection of any deficiencies and the credit or refund
of overpayments, if a petition is timely filed with the board.19
This extension was necessary if the taxpayer was to be granted
review of determinations under Section 722, for the tax return
must be computed and filed without benefit of the section before
an application for relief will be entertained. 19
189. Int. Rev. Code § 712. See supra note 177.
190. Int. Rev. Code § 725(a).
191. Or, if a foreign corporation doing business or having an office within
the United States, less than 48 months before the beginning of the corpora
tion's first taxable year under the statute. See supra note 177.
192. Excess profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 9.
193. See supra p. 686.
194. Int. Rev. Code § 732(a), Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 9.
See H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 15.
195. Int. Rev. Code § 722(e), Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 6.
See H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 15.
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The authorities under the earlier acts denying court review
of abnormalities determinations'" met qualified congressional
approval, for the statute now specifically provides that "If . . .
the determination of any question is necessary solely by reason
of section 711(b) (1) (H), (I), (J), or (K), section 721, ,or sec-
tion 722, the determination of such question shall not be reviewed
or redetermined by any court or agency except the Board."'9
The comment of the committee report 98 indicatesthat the adverb
"solely" is intended seriously. Under the earlier legislation it was
held that the granting of special relief precluded subsequent
judicial review or redetermination of any of the factors entering
into the determination, such as the taxpayer's net income for
either excess profits or income tax purposes.99 In the report on
Section 732 of the current act it was said:
"If . . . the Commissioner determines, for example, the
amount of income derived by a, taxpayer from a transac-
tion falling within section 721 (a) (2) (E), relating to amounts
included in gross income for the taxable year by reason of the
termination of a lease of real property, and the amount so
determined is contested by the taxpayer, the question as to
amount of such income is not one arising solely by reason of
the abnormality provisions bt independently of them and
hence review of the determination as to the amount in such a
case is not confined to the Board. '20 0
The "amount of such income" is still a necessary element in
determining whether special relief is due, under the 125 per cent
provision; but the broad administrative discretion which was the
basis for such decisions under the former acts201 has been
replaced by mwre. rigid tests, under which the taxpayer is entitled
to relief if it demonstrates that its circumstances meet the statu-
tory conditions. This is no less true of those fields in which
power has been delegated to the commissioner, for such power
is to be exercised by quasi legislative regulation rather than by
quasi judicial consideration of the peculiar condition affecting
196. See supra p. 674 et seq.
197. Int. Rev. Code § 732(c), Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941,
} 9.
19& H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., lst Bess. (1941) 14-15.
199. Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U.S. 502, 53 S.Ct. 413, 77 L.Ed.
921 (1933); Welch v. Obispo Oil Co., 301 U.S. 190, 57 S.Ct. 684, 81 L.Ed. 1033
(1937). See supra p. 676.
200. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Bess. (1941) 15.
201. See Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551, 559-
561, 48 S.Ct. 587, 589-590, 72 L.Ed. 985, 987-988 (1928).
[Vol. III
EXCESS PROFITS TAXATION
the individual taxpayer, of which the net income ascertained
might be the deciding factor.
Unless the courts are swayed by analogies which are more
apparent than real, court review and redetermination of col-
lateral matters and in collateral actions will be much less re-
stricted under the new statute than under the old one.
WHAT RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED?
If the ideal is to be attained, and only truly excess profits are
to be subjected to the levy, a taxpayer affected by abnormalities
should have its tax reduced to that which would have been due
had conditions been normal. If the abnormality affects the excess
profits credit, an artificial credit should be constructed which
avoids the results of the abnormal conditions; if it affects the net
income for the taxable year, that sum should be reduced to the
amount which normally would have been realized in the absence
of the abnormality. The latter is comparatively easy; if a specific
item can be pointed out as abnormal, the value of that item can
usually be assessed with fair accuracy, and determination of the
amount equitably subject to tax is a matter of simple subtrac-
tion. The construction of an accurate artificial excess profits
credit, however-whether done directly, or by correction of the
invested capital" or base period net earnings, as the case may be
-may call for only vaguely scientific guesswork.
If another taxpayer could be found which is identical except
that the conditions affecting it are entirely normal, the knot
could be cut by simply applying its tax to the applicant.
Unfortunately, "identical" corporations exist only in theory and
hypotheses; but the 1918 and 1921 Acts attempted to apply the
principle by directing that the successful applicant's tax be "the
amount which bears the same ratio to the net income of the tqlc-
payer . . . as the average tax of representative corporations.
engaged in a like or similar trade or business, bears to their
average net income ... for such year. '2 2 Factors to be considered
in selecting these comparable corporations were "character of
business, size and condition of plant, gross income, net income,
profit per unit of business transacted and capital employed, the
amount and rate of war profits or excess profits, and all other
relevant facts and circumstances. ' '2 0°
202. Int. Rev. Code § 328(a), 40 Stat. 1093 (1919) and 42 Stat. 275 (1923).
The clauses omitted directed that the $3,000 exemption be deducted from
both net incomes for the purposes of the comparison.
203. U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, 62, Art. 911. The first two factors enumerated
did not appear in Regulations 45.
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This was probably the most severely criticized feature of the
1918 and 1921 Acts.2"' The taxpayer did not know what corpora-
tions were selected to be compared with his, and those chosen
frequently bore little resemblance to the claimant's.205 Moreover,
the comparatives procedure would not alleviate abnormalities
which affected an entire industry 206 and the leading concerns
in each industry (which usually were selected as the compara-
tives by which other taxpayers were measured) had no
remedy.207
No clear measure of relief was indicated in the hastily drawn
general section of the 1940 Act 208 but the 1941 amendments pro-
duced a variety of elaborate and varied provisions expressed
specifically in terms of percentages of past averages, of the nor-
mal tax net income, and of the excess profits tax under the ordi-
nary computation; and one exceedingly intangible measure
which will probably cause more trouble than all the others com-
bined. In general, the relief to be granted under the present
statute is that which would reduce the taxpayer's abnormality
to the maximum discrimination which is denied relief under the
limitations- of the sections applicable. This cognate relationship
which the measure of relief bears to the limitations upon the
granting of relief permits summary consideration of most of
these stipulations at this point, for the same policies motivated
adoption and the same criticisms are applicable.
The computation of the tax due from a taxpayer who is
affected by abnormalities affecting gross income of the taxable
year, relievable under Section 721,209 is less formidable as a prob-
lem of mathematics than the involved approach of the statute
would indicate. In essence, it considers as "normal" 125 per cent
of the average gross income of that class which the taxpayer
has received during four previous taxable years, and allocates to
the years to which it is properly attributable the excess minus a
pro rata share of the expenses involved in earning the abnormal
income; but no provision is made for raising the excess profits
credit if a portion of the abnormal income is attributable to the
204. Cogger, op. cit. supra note 10, at 421. Cf. Barton, op. cit. supra note
75, at 335. See Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 162.
205. Barton, loc. cit. supra note 204; Cogger, loc. cit. supra note 204.
206. See supra p. 682.
207. Joint Hearings Report, supra note 3, at 162.
208. Int. Rev. Code § 722; Second Revenue Act of 1940, § 722. The relief
provision of Section 721 was the skeleton of that employed under the 1941
amendment of that section, which will be discussed in the text.
209. Int. Rev. Code 1 721; Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, § 5.
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base period years. To follow the statute, the "net abnormal
income" must first be computed: the amount of the abnormal
income complained of minus (1) 125 per cent of the average
amount of gross income of the same class during four previous
taxable years, 210 and (2) the pro rata share, allocable to the dif-
ference of those two items, of the direct costs or expenses
through the expenditure of which this abnormal income was
in whole or in part derived, which are deductible in determin-
ing the normal-tax net income of the taxable year.2 1 1 The portion
of this net abnormal income which is attributable to other than
the taxable year is then determined under regulations prescribed
by the commissioner, 12 and that amount is deducted from the
gross income for the current taxable year; a partial excess profits
tax is then computed on this basis.218
Thus the T Company, which files its returns upon the calen-
dar year basis, began performance of a construction contract
on January 2, 1939; the contract was completed on June 1, 1941,
on which date the full consideration, $250;000, was paid to the
Company. T Company regularly receives income of this class,
the average amount for four previous taxable years being $100,-
000, and it reports such income upon the completed contract basis
in accordance with Section 19.42-4 (b), Regulations 103. Costs
and expenses in performance of the contract totaled $200,000,
$80,000 having been expended in 1939 and the same sum in 1940,
and $40,000 in 1941. The T Company's excess profits credit com-
puted on the income basis is $15,000, and in addition to the $250,-
000 from this contract it received only $10,000 of includible in-
come in 1941, in the earning of which no expenses were entailed.
Since the T Company's income from long-term contracts dur-
ing 1941 exceeds 125 per cent of its average income of that class
in four previous taxable years, it is entitled to the benefits of
Section 721.214
210. Int. Rev. Code § 721(a) (3) (A), construed with reference to Id. at
I 721(a) (1).
211. Id. at § 721(a)(3)(B).
212. Id. at § 721(b). See U.S. Tress. Reg. 109, § 30.721 (promulgated before
the amendment of the 1941 amendments, but probably still valid).
213. Int. Rev. Code § 721(c) (1).
214. Id. at § 721(a)(2)(B).
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Applying the statute to determine relief:
Gross income 1941 $260,000
Gross income from long-term contracts $250,000
125% of average income of this class $125,000
Pro rata share of expenses
X $250,000-$125,000 100,000
$200,000 $250,000
Sum of last. two items 225,000
Net abnormal income2 15  $25,000
Net abnormal income attributable to years other
than 1941 (4/5 of last item)216 20,000
Gross income for purposes of § 721 (c) (1) $240,000
Deductions 1941217 200,000
Normal-tax net income as reduced by § 721 (c) (1) $40,000
Income tax 19412 18  12,540
Excess profits net income 1941219 $27,460
Excess profits credit $15,000
Exemption2 2 0  5,000
Sum of last two items 20,000
Adjusted excess profits net income 221  $7,460
Excess profits tax under Section 721 (c) (1)
(25% of last item) 222  $1,865
215. Id. at § 721 (a)(3).
216. Computed in accordance with U.S. Treas. Reg. 109, § 30.721-3, pro-
mulgated before the 1941 amendments but probably still applicable.
217. The total expenses attendant upon performance of the contract.
See U.S. Treas. 103, § 19.42-4(b).
218. Under Int. Rev. Code § 711(a)(1)(A), "The deduction for taxes shall
be increased by an amount equal to the income [tax] . . . for such taxable
year," for the purpose of computing the excess profits net income. This
adjustment is treated as a separate item to render it more- apparent in the
example.
Since Section 721(c) relates only to the excess profits tax, the income
tax is computed upon the normal-tax net income [Int. Rev. Code § 13(a)
(2)] without subtraction of amounts of abnormal income attributable to
other years. The tax in the example is computed at the rate fixed by Sec-
ond Revenue Act of 1940, § 101, amending Int. Rev. Code §§ 13(b)(1) and 15,
53 Stat. 863(1939), or 24% of $60,000; the corporation income tax rates for
1941 will probably be raised by the revenue act now under consideration
by Congress, with the effect of reducing the adjusted excess profits net
income subject to the excess profits tax.
219. The excess profits net income is the normal-tax net income, as
defined in Int. Rev. Code § 13(a)(2), with the adjustments directed in Sec-
tion 711(a), of which the only adjustment relevant to the example is the
additional deduction for income taxes (see note 218, supra).
220. Int. Rev. Code § 710(b)(1).
221. Id. at § 710(b).
222. Id. at § 710(a)(1), as applied under the direction of Section 721(c)
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But $10,000 of this abnormal income is attributable to 1940,
which was also subject to the excess profits tax; if this sum had
actually been received and returned in that year, as the attribu-
tion fictitiously considers that it was, the tax for that year would
have been increased. So there is added, to the tax which is pay-
able for 1941, the additional sum which the T Company would
have had to pay in 1940 if this $10,000 had been returned in that
year.2 2 8 Assuming that T Company paid a 1940 excess profits tax
of $4,000 upon a gross income of $100,000 and an adjusted excess
profits net income of $16,000, the computation would be:
Partial tax computed under Section 721 (c) (1) (see above) $1,865
Gross income 1940 $100,000
Income added for purposes of § 721 (c) (2) 10,000
Total of last two items $110,000
Deductions and income tax for 1940
(assumed) 64,000
Fictitioys excess profits net income $46,000
Excess profits credit 1940 $15,000
Exemption 1940 5,000
Total credit and exemption 20,000
Adjusted excess profits net income (fictitious) $26,000
Tax due on last item2 2 4
First $20,000 $5,000
30% on remaining $6,000 1,800
Total tax $6,800
Minus tax paid for 1940 4,000
Amount to be added, under § 721 (c) (2),
to tax payable for 1941 2,800
Total tax payable for 1941225 $4,665
There still remains the $10,000 attributable to the base period
year 1939, which-if the fiction of restoration to proper years is
to be carried through logically-should be added to the gross and
net incomes for that year, with a consequent increase of the
223. Section 721(c) (2). It was probably the lack of a provision of this
kind which led to administrative nonacquiescense in such cases as Pitts-
burgh Supply Co., 14 B.T.A. 620 (1928) [See VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 69 (1929)] and
Red Salmon Canning Co., 15 B.T.A. 790 (1929). [See VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 70
(1929)].
224. Int. Rev. Code § 710(a)(1).
225. Id. at I 721(c).
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excess profits credit. This would diminish the adjusted excess
profits net income subject to tax not only for the year 1941, but
also for 1940 and for all future years. But the relief stops there:
That amount of abnormal income attributable to years previous
to 1940 is entirely disregarded. This is illogical, but any other
solution would necessitate revision of excess profits tax pay-
ments for all past years each time a sum of abnormal income
partially attributable to a base period year might appear. This
would be an impossible burden upon the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
If a portion of the abnormal income is attributable to a
future year, that sum is simply added to the gross income for
that year when the time for filing returns arrives, and the excess
profits tax is computed upon the whole.2 2 6 The taxpayer is pro-
tected from the possibility of its being in a higher bracket in
the subsequent year, or the rates of the tax being increased, by
the limitation that the additional tax because of attributable
income actually received in a previous taxable year may not
exceed the amount saved the taxpayer in that year by the use
of this remedy, there being considered the amounts paid in
intervening years to which a portion of the amount received
may be attributable and upon which additional tax is paid. The
government is protected against avoidance of the tax in the
future year by the taxpayer's liquidation or transfer of substan-
tially all its assets. This protection is offered by the provision of
Section 721 (b) that in either of those events all amounts attrib-
utable to a future year shall be attributed to the first taxable
year in which such transfer or distribution occurs; or to the year
in which the abnormal income would be includible but for the
relief measure, if that year is subsequent to that in which the
first transfer or distribution occurs. Thus if the T Company
received an abnormal sum includible in gross income of 1940 for
the performance of a contract in 1941 and 1942, it could not
secure the benefits of Section 721 if it began distribution of assets
in 1940 or any previous year; if it begins such distribution in
1941, the portion of the abnormal income attributable to 1942,
and upon which the tax would otherwise be due at that time,
is automatically added to that attributable to 1941.
Insofar as adjustment of abnormal current income is con-
cerned, the 125 per cent rule is the only factor which prevents
the taxpayer's securing complete relief under Section 721; and
226. Id. at § 721(d).
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that stipulation was necessary as the concomitant of the prohibi-
tion against the granting of relief unless the gross abnormal
income exceeds 125 per cent of the past average of that class.22
Otherwise a taxpayer with a 126 per cent abnormal income could
secure reduction up to 100 per cent if all of the item were attrib-
utable to past or future years, while a taxpayer with a 125 per
cent abnormal income could secure no relief at all. If it is abnor-
mal for the taxpayer to receive income of that class, the 125 per
cent limitation is inapplicable2 8 and apparently complete relief
may be secured.229
This result is clearly specified in Section 711,20 providing fox
the disallowance of abnormal deductions during the base period,
under which section the 125 per cent rule is equally applicable
when the taxpayer regularly has deductions of the same class.281
No attempt is made to allocate deductions abnormal in amount
in the year taken but attributable to other years, so most of the
problems of relief under Section 721 do not arise. There is a limi-
tation upon relief under Section 711, however, that, the abnormal
deductions during the base period year may not be reduced below
the amount of the deduction in the same class for the taxable
year under consideration. 282
The greatest problem of measure of relief, from the taxpay-
er's viewpoint, is presented by Section 722. Assuming that the
taxpayer has shown that it is affected by a change in the charac-
ter of its business or an inteiruption or diminution of its opera-
tions during the base period which entitles it to computation of
its excess profits credit under that section, the taxpayer still must
establish "the amount that would have been its average base
period net income" if none of the abnormal events had occurred
227. Id. at 1 721(a)(1).
228. Ibid.
229. Id. at § 721(c), as construed by reference to Section 721(a)(3), does
not specify this result, but if the "average amount of the gross income of
the same class determined under paragraph (1)" is zero, this is the neces-
sary consequence of multiplying 0 by 1.25. But may it not be abnormal for
the taxpayer to receive income of a certain class, although it has received
an item of .income of that class during one of the previous four years? If
so, the strict application of the terms of Section 721(a)(8) in computing
relief under Section 721(c) might result in the taxpayer's being entitled to
relief under the section, but the measure of relief being an increase in the
tax payable. The spirit if not the letter of the provision could be pre-
served by applying Int. Rev. Code I 711(b)(1)(;)(i) by analogy.
280. Ibid..
231. Id. at I 711(b)(1)(J)(ii).
232. Id. at I 711(b)(1)(J)(iii).
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or if the character of the business during the base period had
been the same as on January 1, 1940.283
In at least one situation which Section 722 was doubtless
designed to relieve, this burden of proof will be very simple. A
representative of Marshall Field & Company testified at the Joint
Hearing23 4 that his corporation had, prior to 1940, operated both
retail and wholesale departments; and that the losses of the lat-
ter department in large degree absorbed the profits of the former.
Liquidation of the wholesale department was completed in 1939,
arid the character of the business thereafter was exclusively
retail. It is obvious from the testimony- that separate books
were kept on the two departments, and Marshall Field will easily
be able to establish, to an odd cent, what its average base period
net income would have been had the wholesale department been
liquidated four years earlier.
Somewhat more difficult will be the problem of filling in the
profits gap of a taxpayer who has suffered a fire, flood, or strike
during the base period. It can be no more than informed guess,
determined by reference to past and subsequent earnings; but-
unless the taxpayer's income fluctuates widely and unpredict-
ably-it will be no more difficult than the computation of dam-
ages in many breach of contract suits.
But what of the corporation which has expanded its plant?23 8
If it was operating at less than full capacity before expansion,
the indication is that the enlargement of facilities was dictated
by increased demand due directly or indirectly to the defense
program-and that the increased profits are those which it is the
purpose of the act to tax. Under those circumstances-the tax-
payer might well be left to computation of its excess profits
credit under the ordinary provisions of the statute. 237 If there is
no such indication, however, how is it to be determined what
portion of the taxpayer's present production capacity could have
been absorbed by the market demand which existed several
years before?
What, too, of a taxpayer in existence during only part of the
base period 2 8-how can it be intelligently guessed, much less
233. Id. at I 722(a).
234. Statement of Kenneth E. Armstrong, Joint Hearings Report, supra
note 3, at 260 et seq.
235. Id. at 261.
236. Int. Rev. Code § 722(b)(2)(B).
237. With the benefit, of course, of Section 713(a) (1) (B) if the income
basis is adopted.
238. Id. at § 722(b)(2)(D).
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proved, what would have been earned during years in which the
corporation was not in existence? And what of a corporation
which acquired the assets of a competitor in the last months of
1939?289
It was failure to sustain the burden of proof which led to
most of the rejections of special assessment claims under the 1918
and 1921 Acts,240 and it may be feared that Section 722 will offer
even greater obstacles to relief.
This criticism is consciously without constructive suggestion.
The burden of proof must necessarily be placed upon the tax-
payer to prevent abuse of the relief provisions; and speculation
over the "might have been" is always an inexact and usually
futile pursuit, in which imaginative historians have excelled ac-
countants and lawyers.
In the case of expanded capacity the administrative official
might ease the burden by assuming that the taxpayer could have
earned during the base period years that income per unit on its
present plant which was averaged in that industry during the
same period; but this is merely an application of the compara-
tives principle which provoked so much criticism under the
earlier acts, and moreover the computation is based upon factors
which may not be readily available. And even this would offer
little assistance when the taxpayer has acquired its chief com-
petitor;24 1 this raises problems of control of supply which
economists frequently consider but rarely attempt to evaluate.
The figures so determined, by whatever means, are import-
ant not only in the computation of average base period net in-
come, and consequently of the excess profits credit on income
basis, 24 12 but may also determine one of the limitations upon the
relief which may be granted under Section 722. The average base
period net income indicated by these assumptions may not ex-
ceed the excess profits net income for the last taxable year in
the base period-which may be determined in exactly the same
way.2" If the character of the business actually was the same
during this last taxable year of the base period, as on January 1,
239. Id. at § 722(b)(2)(E). See illustration, H. R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) 12.
240. See supra p. 684.
241. Int. Rev. Code § 742, as amended by Excess Profits Tax Amend-
ments of 1941, § 8, does not offer an adequate solution, for the competition
may have reduced both corporations to inadequate earnings or even losses.
See example, M.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Bess. (1941) 12.
242. Int. Rev. Code § 713.
24. Id. at § 722(b) (4). See H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Bess. (1941) 12.
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1940, and if no abnormal events occurred in that year, the limita-
tion will be a more definite figure.
Further limitations upon the relief to be granted are that
the tax may not be reduced below six per cent of the taxpayer's
normal-tax net income for the taxable year, and that the tax
computed under Section 722 (a) shall be increased by ten per cent
of the tax computed without reference to the section.24' Like the
125 per cent limitation in Sections 721 and 711, discussed above,24 5
these limitations were necessary to keep the relief in harmony
with the conditions required for admittance to the benefits of the
section.26
As has already been stated, these specific limitations were
included so that the Bureau of Internal Revenue would not "be
loaded down with so many petitions for relief as to make it impos-
sible for it to examine and pass upon such requests with requisite
expedition and care. ' 247 This, no doubt, was the utilization of a
lesson learned from the volume of litigation under the earlier
acts.241 "If experience should demonstrate that these limitations
are too high, consideration will be given to their reduction. 249
244. Int. Rev. Code § 722(d). Thus if the taxpayer's normal-tax net
income is $100,000, its excess profits tax without benefit of Section 722 is
$11,000, and its tax computed under Section 722(a) is $5,000, the tax may
not be reduced below $6,100 ($5,000 tax computed under Section 722(a) plus
$1,100 or 10% of the tax computed without reference to Section 722), since
this is also in excess of 6% of the normal-tax net income ($6,000). But if the
tax without reference to Section 722 were $9,000, the 10% clause would fix
a limitation of only $5,900, and the 6% limitation ($6,000) would be the
effective one.
If the taxpayer were entitled to the benefits of both Section 722 and
Section 721, presumably the tax under Section 721(c) would be computed
first, and the 10% limitation of Section 722(d) would refer to 10% of that
sum ("the tax computed without reference to (Section 7221"). But does
the "6 per centum of the taxpayer's normal-tax net income" limitationi
[Section 722(d)] refer to the strict definition of Section 13(a)(2), or to the
reduced normal-tax net income which is determined for the purposes of
Section 721 by reducing the taxpayer's gross income [Section 271(c)(1)]
with consequent similar effect upon its net income [cf. Section 21], adjusted
net income [cf. Section 13(a)(1)], and normal-tax net income [Section 13(a)(2)], although nothing is said in Section 721(c) of the latter three items?
Applied to the example given supra p. 707 et seq., the limitation under the
former interpretation would be $3,600 (6% of $60,000), under the latter
$2,400 (6% of $40,000). The latter seem the preferable construction; for the
Purposes of the excess profits tax the effect of Section 721(c) is to consider
sums of abnormal income attributable to other years as not includible in
gross income for the current taxable year, and consequently all concepts
derived from gross income should reflect this adjustment.
245. See supra p. 711 et seq.
246. Int. Rev. Code § 722(c).
247. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13.
248. See supra p. 684.
249. H.R. Rep. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13.
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CONCLUSION
The following passage is an excerpt from the report submit-
ted by the Committee on Ways and Means on the Excess-Profits
Tax Amendments of 1941:
"Experience with excess-profits taxes, both in the United
States and abroad, has demonstrated conclusively that relief
in abnormal cases cannot be predicated on specific instances
foreseeable at any time. The unusual cases that are Certain to
arise are so diverse in character and unpredictable that relief
provisions couched in other than general and. flexible terms
are certain to prove inadequate.
"For these reasons, the present legislation attempts to pro-
vide, both by specific terms and in carefully guarded general
terms, a set of flexible rules which should alleviate at least
the bulk of the severe hardship cases which. may arise. The
success or failure of legislation of this type depends, to a con-
siderable degree, upon its intelligent and sympathetic admin-
istration. Through its confidence in the experience and ability
of the officials of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, your committee recommend the present
flexible and broad legislation as the most satisfactory method
of meeting the contingencies that will arise.
'2 50
This expression of legislative intention and grasp of the
problems presented is realistic and entirely laudable. But has the
performance of Congress matched its intentions? Certainly there
is no general measure for the relief of abnormalities affecting
capital and income comparable to Sections 327 and 328 of the
1918 and 1921 Acts,2 5' or Section 722 of the 1940 Act as originally
passed.252 Congress has chosen to treat the various types of ab-
normalities separately-which may be equally effective and per-
haps preferable, if the entire field is covered.
Under this statute the abnormalities which may arise and
require relief may affect either the income for the current year,
the excess profits credit computed from prior earnings, or that
computed upon the capital basis. As has been shown, not all of
these possible situations have been provided for.
Section 721 provides fairly adequately for abnormalities in
250. Id. at 2.
251. Supra, p. 673 et seq.
252. Supra, p. 684 et seq.
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the gross income of the current taxable year;2 58 but the net in-
come may be abnormal because of low deductions, while the
gross income remains unaffected.254
Section 722 is somewhat less complete in its scope, which
purportedly extends to abnormalities affecting the base period
income and therefore the excess profits credit computed thereon.2 15
In this it is supplemented by Section 711 (b) (1) (H), (I), (J), and
(K), providing relief-to what extent is not entirely apparent-
for abnormal deductions in the base period years
25 6
So there are situations not covered by the relief sections
which affect income and the income excess profits credit. The
most serious fault in the statute, however, is the omission of any
provision, narrow or broad, for the correction of abnormalities
affecting the excess profits credit determined on the capital basis.
This may result in a very real prejudice against corporations
which must adopt the capital basis computation-and, as has been
shown, these include all corporations organized since December
31, 1939, unless they are entitled to the benefits of Section 742.2 57
If the alternative excess profits credit computed on capital
basis is to be retained at all-for that is a confession that not all
taxpayers can secure equitable treatment under the prior income
computation-there should be a general provision for relief of
abnormalities affecting that basis. This provision might well take
the form adopted for Section 721, providing specifically for all
those circumstances which Congress can foresee, and thus avoid-
ing the need for administrative discretion in its application; but
there must be a general clause permitting the commissioner or the
Board of Tax Appeals to make adjustments in cases not foresee-
able, and in cases in which the abnormality is not a single, select-
able factor, but a combination of relatively intangible factors.
If Congress is unwilling to grant such wide discretion to the
commissioner, fearing public misinterpretation and criticism of
his decisions and the possibility of his being faced with so many
applications that none could be handled adequately, it should
at least provide relief for new corporations. Under the statute as
it stands a corporation organized during the base period years
(1936 to 1939, inclusive -258 ) has three alternative bases upon which
253. Supra, p. 686 et seq.
254. Supra, p 692 et seq.
255. Supra, p 693 et seq.
256. Supra, p. 697 et seq.
257. Supra, p. 698, and note 177.
258. See note 175 supra.
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to compute its excess profits credit;2 9 an enterprise begun two
days later, or at any time thereafter, must adopt the capital
basis. 260 This is a very real discrimination against a class of tax-
payers especially susceptible to abnormal conditions and particu-
larly in need of fair treatment.
Discouragement of new business enterprises is always unde-
sirable, as a matter of policy; but the application of an income-
basis excess profits tax to entirely new corporations is a difficult
problem at best. Since they were not in existence during the base
period years selected as "normal," the statutory test can offer no
indication of their normal earning power. Yet in many instances
the abnormal conditions which may be expected to arise were
relieved under the 1918 and 1921 Acts.26 '
The simplest solution would be to re-phrase Section 722 (b)
(2) (D) so as to read
"(D) the taxpayer was not in existence during the whole




There would still remain the taxpayer's burden of proving "the
amount that would have been its average base period net income"
if it had been in existence during the base period,26 3 which may
be almost insurmountable if the letter of the statute is applied.
Adequate relief can be granted only by an officer or board
with quasi judicial power to consider the peculiar conditions
affecting the individual applicant. The relief preferably should be
elastic, and therefore necessarily should rest in the discretion of
the authority upon whom the power of determination is conferred;
but if a criterion must be indicated, the "representative corpora-
tions" principle of the earlier acts is probably least objectionable.
Rather than being applied to determine the rate of tax payable,
however, these comparatives wherever possible should be used to
259. (1) Capital basis (Section 714); (2) Income basis (see note 175 supra) :
(3) It may avail itself of special relief under Section 722(b)(2)(D), if it
feels that it can establish what its earnings would have been had it been in
existence during the base period (see supra, p. 711 et seq.) and that the credit
so established will be greater than that obtainable under either of the first
two options.
260. See note 177 supra. Superficially, Section 713(b) (1) (B) is incon-
sistent with this; but note 175 supra. Even Section 721 may be inapplicable
during the first year of corporate existence. See note 131 supra.
261. See supra pp. 691-692, and note 148; p. 701 and notes 183, 184.
262. The present phrasing is "(D) the taxpayer was in existence during
only part of its base period." Section 712 and 741, of course, would require
amendment to accord with the suggested provision.
263. See supra p. 711 et seq.
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determine the corrective of the particular abnormal condition
involved: If officers' salaries are abnormally low, the taxpayer
should be permitted as an additional deduction the difference
between the sums paid and the average salary deductions of
comparable taxpayers; if the business is one in which income
is largely attributable to personal effort of the managers, the
taxpayer's excess profits credit should be raised to that percent-
age of its invested capital which is the average rate of return
of other enterprises in the same trade or business during the
"normal" base period years.
The administration of such a provision would require much
care and time. No doubt it would provoke criticism and suspiciori,
but certainly it would be preferable to the denial of relief, how-
ever meritorious the case, which must result in many instances
under the present statute.
Congress has striven valiantly to steer a course between the
Scylla of inflexibility and the Charybdis of possible administra-
tive abuse; and it has succeeded, at least, to the satisfaction of
a press2 6 ' which has found events abroad more newsworthy than
those in the halls of Washington. It may be hoped that Congress,




I. Abnormalities affecting the basis of
computation of the excess profits
credit.
A. When invested capital is the basis,
and
1. Income-producing property is
excluded from invested capital
by the terms of the statute.
2. Income is attributable in large
part to intangible factors which
cannot be capitalized.
B. When the basis is prior earnings,
and





264. Time, March 10, 1941, p. 77: "Last week businessmen had the satis-
faction of seeing almost every one of their suggestions adopted at last. If




has so materially changed that
the .past earnings are not -fairly
representative of present earn-
ing power.
2. The corporation experienced ab-
normally low net earnings dur-
ing one or more years of the
base period.
3. The taxpayer corporation is ma-
terially prejudiced by the time
of incorporation.
II. Abnormalities affecting the taxpay-
er's income for the taxable year.
A. When the taxpayer has received
"income" during the taxable year
which is not properly attributable
to its income-producing activities
of that year.
B. When the taxpayer's expense de-
ductions have been abnormally low
during the taxable year, because
sums properly attributable to busi-
ness expenses of that year have not
actually been paid during that
period.
§ 722 (a) (1).
§ 722 (a) (2);
§ 711 (b) (1) (H),
(I), (J), and (K).
I rganized before
Jan. 1, 1940: § 722
(a) (1), under § 722(b) (2) (D).
Organized after
Dec. 31, 1939: None
§ 721;
None.
NOTE: This chart relates to general relief provisions open to
any taxpayer affected by the type of abnormality in question,
although subject to the qualifications and limitations set forth in
the text. It does not purport to indicate the specific sections
(such as §§ 725-727) which offer either complete exemption from,
or limitations upon the amount of, the tax on stipulated types of
enterprises which might otherwise require relief because of ab-
normal conditions usually inherent; nor alternative provisions
for computation of the excess profits credit, such as § 742, which
diminish the number of taxpayers which may be affected by
abnormalities rather than providing for relief of such conditions.
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